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ABSTRACT
When the police violate a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights, what
often follows is the discovery of incriminating evidence. Sometimes the evidence
is discovered directly after the Fourth Amendment violation. In other situations,
the evidence comes by a more indirect route and may occur long after the
original Fourth Amendment violation. Courts struggle when trying to decide if
the discovery of this indirectly obtained evidence was caused by the police
misconduct. This causal question is important because causality acts as a
limiting principle when deciding when to apply the exclusionary rule. A basic
view of the exclusionary rule suggests that evidence should not be excluded when
its discovery was not caused by the misconduct of the police. Yet, courts struggle
with deciding the scope of a Fourth Amendment violation. The United States
Supreme Court crafted the attenuation doctrine to assist in establishing the
breadth of a Fourth Amendment violation. Attenuation simply stands for the
proposition that not all evidence that is discovered subsequent to a Fourth
Amendment violation is a consequence of that violation. Sometimes, the evidence
results from an altogether different cause. If that is the case, the evidence is
“attenuated” and the exclusionary rule should no longer be an issue. Yet, over
time, the Supreme Court has whittled away the straightforward causal nature of
attenuation and has substituted other policy-based tests to assess indirectly
discovered evidence. This undermines the causal nature of attenuation and
serves to diminish its utility by finders of fact. This Article suggests that the time
is right to restore causality to attenuation. By modifying the situations in which
attenuation is used to evaluate the causal links between illegal police conduct
and the discovery of incriminating evidence and by modifying the tests used to
assess attenuation, we can once again make attenuation a useful causal concept.
Policy will no doubt still drive decisions on what to do with evidence discovered
in such circumstances. Attenuation, however, can best be used as a measure of
causality as opposed to policy-based tests that seem to do little but confound and
confuse.
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In courts across every state and federal jurisdiction in the country on a
weekly, if not daily, basis, judges are confronted with similar basic questions
regarding the relationship between police conduct and the evidence discovered
as a consequence of this conduct. Controversy arises when the police act in ways
contrary to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
improperly search the property of an individual or seize his person.1 Often, the
controversy is exacerbated by the subsequent discovery by the police of very
incriminating evidence of guilt. Judges are then asked the simple, but
fundamental, question of whether the evidence discovered was a product of
unconstitutional police conduct. Another way of stating the question is²did the
police conduct cause the discovery of the evidence? If the answer is yes, then the
discovery of the evidence is also a Fourth Amendment violation, and the judge
is then forced to decide what to do about it.
In most cases, the question of cause is rather easy to answer. If the police
officer unconstitutionally arrests a suspect, searches his person, and discovers
illegal drugs, it is easy for the court to conclude that the evidence was the product
of an unconstitutional arrest and that the arrest caused the discovery of the
evidence. Unfortunately, for trial courts throughout the country, not all questions
of causation are so easily answered. What happens if, after the same illegal arrest,
the suspect consents to a search of his person and illegal drugs are discovered.
Or, after the same illegal arrest, the suspect confesses to a crime. Is the evidence
discovered following the consensual search a product of the original Fourth
Amendment violation? Is the confession a product of the unconstitutional arrest?
These situations of indirectly discovered evidence have vexed our courts for
decades.
Part of the reason these situations are difficult is simply because,
factually, it is hard to tell if the consent or confession is due to the conduct of the
police or to something else. Maybe it is the consequence of cost/benefit analysis
by a carefully calculating criminal, or maybe advice of counsel, or deep guilt, or
a combination of all of these factors. However, it may just as easily be due to the
illegal arrest and nothing else. While we all have common sense instincts as to
what may have motivated the suspects conduct, it is never objectively obvious.
These cases are also difficult because, when we assess causal responsibility to
police misconduct for indirectly discovered evidence, we are dramatically
expanding the scope of situations in which courts have to decide what to do about
the incriminating evidence. Perhaps, we might argue, by extending the causal
chain so far, we are forcing decisions about evidence that we do not wish to
make. Whether the conduct of officer A caused the eventual discovery of
evidence B may not be as important²from a policy perspective²as whether we
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wish to make A responsible for B, with all the consequences that this carries with
it.2
This fear of consequence has resulted in a United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence that has struggled to separate the causal question from the policybased consequences that flow from the causal conclusion. Given that the primary
remedy for evidence seized as a consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation
has been to exclude the evidence from any subsequent criminal proceeding, the
stakes are certainly high.3 The Supreme Court, never greatly enamored with the
exclusionary rule,4 has seen manipulation of the underlying causal question as a
means of limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule. Thus, the Court has created
and expanded on the concept of attenuation. Attenuation is the simple
proposition that sometimes the evidence is too far removed from the original
police misconduct to allow for a conclusion that the misconduct caused the
discovery of the evidence.5 The Supreme Court has attempted to flesh out this
basic causal concept but has often done more to confuse than clarify attenuation
and its applicability.
Commentators have not always helped in preserving the logic and
simplicity of attenuation. Analogies to tort law and proximate cause have simply
undermined the basic causal nature of attenuation. Proximate cause is a policybased concept.6 The advocates of analogizing attenuation with proximate cause
are, thus, suggesting that questions of the causal reach of a particular action are
best informed by what we wish for the outcome to be rather than what causality
tells us it is. When the overwhelming desire is to admit this indirectly discovered
evidence, the driving force in the analysis is no longer causality based on fact,
but outcomes based on policy. These proponents of attenuation as policy, as a
commentator on an altogether different topic so aptly pXWLW³ZHUHQHLWKHUVWXSLG
or operating in bad faith . . . their logical reasoning was subordinated to dogmatic
ILUVW SULQFLSOHV´7 This first principle²avoiding the exclusionary rule at any
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 80 Side B

2
See H. L. A. HART & A. M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 88 (1959) (noting that
³[j]udges may simply choose not to refer to causal language to rules limiting liability out of
considerations of policy or convenience´ 
3

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (where the Court observed that the
exclusionary rule allows ³guilty and possibly dangerous criminals to go free´ with the consequence
that the toll imposed by the rule is, in fact, a high obstacle to its use).
4

5

See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 591 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
490 (1963).
6
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See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting). Justice Andrews, in his famous dissent, states that proximate cause means that
³because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines
to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.´Id. +HIXUWKHUREVHUYHV³>7@his is not logic. It
is practical politics.´
7
TONY JUDT & TIMOTHY SNYDER, THINKING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 319 (2012).
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cost²has undermined the concept of attenuation and created a muddled
approach to a fairly straightforward causal concept.
In this Article, it will be argued that the best solution to this problem
would be to return attenuation to its true origins as a means of examining if a
causal link between original police misconduct and subsequently discovered
incriminating evidence exists. By reexamining the tests we use to assess
attenuation, limiting the applicability of the principle to only certain types of
indirectly discovered evidence, redefining certain factors that must be
considered, and suggesting a common sense way to put it all together, this Article
will attempt to restore causality to attenuation. In Part II, we will engage in a
short history of the attenuation concept, particularly as addressed by the United
States Supreme Court. In Part III, this Article will set forth the arguments for
why attenuation is best seen as a causal concept and functions best as a purely
causal measure. In Part IV, we will examine the ways in which attenuation has
been diluted as a causal concept by a Supreme Court focusing on other, noncausal, objectives. Finally, in Part V, this Article will set forth the ways by which
the concept of attenuation can be redefined and limited so as to accentuate the
causal attributes of the concept and limit the non-causal objectives that have
drifted in over time.
The most important question may be why this matters. Why is it
important to limit our discussions of attenuation to a causal mechanism to
examine the linkage between Fourth Amendment violations and subsequently
discovered evidence? Primarily to preserve the utility and integrity of the
concept. Causation is fact based. It does not change over time²no logical
determination does. The ebb and flow of the policy debates surround the
exclusionary rule are immaterial to causation. When, however, attenuation is
modified to address policy concerns we turn the concept into one which will be
changed and modified (perhaps forever) by a Court that struggles to address the
consequences of Fourth Amendment violations when the evidence in question is
clearly evidence of guilt. Fact finders²judges²in trial courts throughout this
country need useful tests to establish causality. Today, attenuation is no longer
such a test.
A SHORT HISTORY OF ATTENUATION

The following section will provide a brief history of attenuation through
the lens of the most significant Supreme Court decisions which have addressed
the concept. The reader should readily see the manner in which the concept has
evolved through Supreme Court jurisprudence.
A. Nardone v. United States: Attenuation Is Born
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As is often the case, the concept of attenuation had a fairly obscure birth
with no indication that it would grow up and attain the significance it has. The
first reference to the concept was in the Supreme Court decision of Nardone v.

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 81 Side B

 

152

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹʹ

WEST
LAW
REVIEW
West Virginia
LawVIRGINIA
Review, Vol.
124,
Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 7

[Vol. 124

8
9
10
11
12
13

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 81 Side B

United States.8 There, in a follow-up to a previous case9 involving the use of
illegally intercepted telephone messages, the Court examined the legality of the
JRYHUQPHQW¶V XVH RI WKHVH PHVVDJHV WR REWDLQ RWKHU LQFULPLQDWLQJ HYLGHQFH
against the defendant.10 The Court went through a fairly simple process of
analysis and concluded that, consistent with Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,11 the federal statute in question²the Communications Act of 1934²
prohibited any use of the illegally obtained materials, even if the use was
derivative. The Court did not stop there, however. Writing for the majority,
Justice Frankfurter went on to describe situations in which this prohibition would
not apply. )LUVW KH QRWHG WKDW LI WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ XVHG ZDV ³JDLQHG IURP DQ
LQGHSHQGHQWVRXUFH´LWZRXOGQRWPDWWHUWKDWWKHLOOHJally obtained information
would also have led to the information in question.12 This argument is consistent
with the subsequently elaborated exception to the Fourth Amendment
H[FOXVLRQDU\UXOHNQRZQDVWKH³LQGHSHQGHQWVRXUFH´GRFWULQH13
Frankfurter went further than this, however. In a somewhat throwaway
portion of the opinion, KHQRWHG³>V@RSKLVWLFDWHGDUJXPHQWPD\SURYHDFDXVDO
connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSURRI As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may
KDYH EHFRPH VR DWWHQXDWHG DV WR GLVVLSDWH WKH WDLQW´14 From such humble
beginnings the doctrine of attenuation was born.
It is interesting to note several aspects of this brief reference. First, the
Nardone case was not one dealing with the Fourth Amendment at all. Rather, it
was a case interpreting statutory prohibitions on government wiretapping.15
Thus, nothing in the case suggests that the concept of attenuation was intended
to be directly linked to the Fourth Amendment or the exclusionary rule. Second,
it could be argued that the statement is mere dicta. Nothing in the case required
the court to opine on any exception to the basic rule that information obtained
from an illegal wiretap could not be used²even derivatively. The government
certainly never advanced such an argument. Finally, Justice Frankfurter does
VXJJHVW WKDW KLV FRQFHSW RI DWWHQXDWLRQ LV D QHFHVVDU\ FRXQWHU WR WKH ³FDXVDO
DUJXPHQW´ZKLFKPLJKWOLQNWKHLOOHJDOO\REWDLQHGLQIRUPDWLRQIURPVXEVHTXHQW
proof offered by the government.16 This injects causality into the equation and

Nardone v. United States (Nardone II), 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
Nardone v. United States (Nardone I), 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
Nardone II, 308 U.S. at 340.
251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
Nardone II, 308 U.S. at 341.
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).

14
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Nardone II, 308 U.S. at 341.
See TRACY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT¶S EXCLUSIONARY
RULE 34 (2013).
16
Nardone II, 308 U.S. at 341.
15
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suggests that attenuation was always intended to be a concept framed by basic
causal analysis. Nothing in Nardone suggests attenuation is at all tied to remedies
such as the Federal exclusionary rule that had been established in Weeks v.
United States.17
B. Costello v. United States: Still an Amorphous Concept
Attenuation next surfaces in a significant way in Costello v. United
States.18 In Costello, the Court makes a passing reference to attenuation in a way
that suggests it has yet to be viewed as a stand-alone concept with anything
approaching a clear definition. The defendant in Costello objected to the
JRYHUQPHQW¶VXVHRILQFULPLQDWLQJVWDWHPHQWV he made to government officials
subsequent to an illegal wiretap on his phone.19 Costello contended that these
incriminating statements were the product of the illegal wiretaps.20 The Supreme
Court rejected the argument, contending that the information obtained from
&RVWHOORZDVLQIDFWREWDLQHGIURPDQ³LQGHSHQGHQWVRXUFH´21 The Court went
RQWRFLWHLQLWVHQWLUHW\-XVWLFH)UDQNIXUWHU¶VVWDWHPHQWRQDWWHQXDWLRQIRXQGLQ
Nardone.22 The Court then held that the incriminating statements given by
Costello werH WKH FRQVHTXHQFH RI DQ LQGHSHQGHQW VRXUFH DQG ³WKDW DQ\
connection between the wiretaps and the admissions was too attenuated to
UHTXLUHWKHH[FOXVLRQRIWKHDGPLVVLRQVIURPHYLGHQFH´23 One of two conclusions
can be drawn from this brief reference. Either the Court believes that attenuation
DQG³LQGHSHQGHQWVRXUFH´DUHHVVHQWLDOO\WKHVDPHWKLQJRULILWGRHVUHFRJQL]H
them as completely separate concepts, the Court was not prepared to provide any
means by which to determine if attenuation had taken place. At this stage,
attenuation was still an amorphous concept with no clear tests to suggest when,
or if, it applied.
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 82 Side A

C. Wong Sun v. United States: Attenuation Comes to Life
$WWHQXDWLRQ RQO\ UHDOO\ EHJLQV WR FRPH WR OLIH LQ WKH &RXUW¶V 
decision in Wong Sun v. United States.24 In that case, after unlawful entry into
RQHGHIHQGDQW¶VKRPHDQGVHYHUDODUUHVWVZLWKRXWSUREDEOHFDXVHWZRGHIHQGDQWV

17
18
19
20
21

23
24

Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id.
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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22

232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also MACLIN, supra note 15, at 17.
365 U.S. 265 (1961).
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gave incriminating statements.25 The first defendant, James Wah Toy, made
incriminating statements in his bedroom shortly after the police had forced their
way into the room and arrested him.26 The Government argued that the statement
should still be admissible²GHVSLWH WKH FODLP WKDW LW ZDV WKH ³IUXLW RI WKH
SRLVRQRXV WUHH´²because it was the product of ³an intervening act of free
will.´27 The Court, however, dismissed this argument, asserting that, under the
FLUFXPVWDQFHV³LWLVXQUHDVRQDEOHWRLQIHUWKDW7R\¶VUHVSRQVHZDVVXIILFLHQWO\
DQDFWRIIUHHZLOOWRSXUJHWKHSULPDU\WDLQWRIWKHXQODZIXOLQYDVLRQ´28 Wong
6XQ¶VVLWXDWLRQZDVGLIIHUHQWKRZHYHU Wong Sun was illegally arrested, but he
declined to sign the incriminating statement he made to the police on the day of
his arrest.29 After Wong Sun was released, he voluntarily returned to the police
station several days later and made an incriminating statement.30 The Court
FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKLVVWDWHPHQWZDVDGPLVVLEOHEHFDXVH³WKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ
WKH DUUHVW DQG WKH VWDWHPHQW KDG µEHFRPH VR DWWHQXDWHG DV WR GLVVLSDWH WKH
WDLQW¶´31 The Court specifically pointed to the fact that Wong Sun had been
released and had returned voluntarily after the lapse of several days to make the
incriminating statement.32
What we can conclude from Wong Sun is that the concept of attenuation
was still rather undeveloped at this point. A lapse of over 25 years between
Nardone and Wong Sun had not seen the concept of attenuation used in any
meaningful way by the Supreme Court. However, Wong Sun does give us some
hints as to what attenuation might mean.33 Attenuation must mean that something
has taken place which purges the taint that the unlawful conduct of the police has
cast upon the evidence in question. Wong Sun implies that attenuation is a factual
inquiry to determine if something occurred in the case in question that would
have the effect of purging the taint.34 In the case of the defendant Toy, the Court
GLVFXVVHGSK\VLFDOHYLGHQFH GUXJV WKDWZDVREWDLQHGDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRI7R\¶V
statements.35 7KH &RXUW H[FOXGHG WKLV HYLGHQFH DV ZHOO DV 7R\¶V VWDWHPHQWV
because the evidence was not obtained in a manner that would indicate that the

Id.
Id. at 476±77.
Id. at 491.
Id.

32

34
35

See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471.
Id. at 487.
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Id.
Interestingly, one of the few lengthy contemporaneous law review articles about Wong Sun
does not discuss the attenuation doctrine at all. Dale W. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A
Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REV. 483 (1963).
33
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taint of the illegal conduct had somehow been removed.36 As the Court observed,
³WKHPRUHDSWTXHVWLRQLQVXFKDFDVHLVµZKHWKHUJUDQWLQJHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come
at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
GLVWLQJXLVKDEOHWREHSXUJHGRIWKHSULPDU\WDLQW¶´37 This is fundamentally and
exclusively a factual question²nothing about it has anything to do with the
appropriate remedy should the taint of the police misconduct attach to the
subsequently discovered evidence. Attenuation would arise when the
incriminating evidence was obtained as a result of a combination of facts that
would indicate that the acquisition of the evidence was not the simple
consequence of police misconduct, but rather was somehow distinguishable from
the original illegality²in other words, something else caused the confession
subsequently made by the defendant. In the case of Wong Sun, those facts were
the lapse of time between the illegality and the incriminating evidence and the
voluntary choice made by the defendant to make the statement.38 The Court
seems to be saying that the acquisition of the evidence in this situation had more
to do with Wong Sun and the choices he made after deliberation than it had to
do with the illegal nature of his original arrest. Fundamentally, this is a question
of causation. What caused Wong Sun to make the statements that he did? The
Court concludes that, whatever it might have been, it was not simply because he
was illegally arrested.39
D. Harrison v. United States: The Beginning of the Confusion

36
37
38
39
40

42
43

Id. at 487±88.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 491.
Id.
392 U.S. 229 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 230±31.
Id.
Id.
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The first significant step towards the muddle we now find ourselves in
with respect to attenuation can be found LQ-XVWLFH:KLWH¶VGLVVHQWLQHarrison v.
United States only five years later.40 There, Justice White criticizes the way the
Court interpreted the concept of fruit of the poisonous tree.41 White claims that
the Court has engaged in an overly simplistic assessment of the poisonous tree
FRQFHSWZKLFKLQWKHHQGZDVDIRFXVRQ³EXW-IRU´FDXVDWLRQ42 White claims
WKDWWKLVFDXVDODSSURDFK³UDUHO\´H[FHSWVLQFXOSDWRU\HYLGHQFHWKDWRFFXUVODWHU
in time²in other words, it is very easy to say that nearly all evidence found after
LOOHJDOSROLFHFRQGXFWZDV³FDXVHG´E\WKHLOOHJDOFRQGXFW43 Then White drops
his bombshell:
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[M]ere causal connection is insufficient to make something an
inadmissible fruit. Rather it must be shown that suppression of
the fruit would serve the same purpose as suppression of the
illegal evidence itself . . . the reason for the suppression of the
original illegal evidence itself is prophylactic²to deter the
police from engaging in such conduct in the future by denying
them its past benefits. Since deterrence is the only justification
for excluding the original evidence, there is no justification for
excluding the fruits of such evidence unless suppression of them
will also serve the prophylactic end.44
White acknowledged the limitations placed on the fruits analysis by attenuation
and favorably cites Nardone and Wong Sun. But then he throws it all away.
:KLWH¶V IRFXV LV RQ UHPHG\ QRW FDXVDWLRQ45 The extent to which he and
subsequent justices confuse these concepts when discussing and defining
attenuation is at the core of the problems that we currently face.
E. United States v. Giordano: A Brief Reference to Attenuation

44

Id. at 231.

45

Id. at 231±35.
422 U.S. 590 (1975).

46
47

49
50

416 U.S. 505 (1974).
Id. at 554 (Powell, J., concurring).
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490 (1963).
See Giordano, 416 U.S. 505.
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Aside from the White dissent in Harrison, the only other significant
development in the attenuation doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence²prior
to the blockbuster decision in Brown v. Illinois46²is a brief reference to the
doctrine in United States v. Giordano.47 There, in a concurrence drafted by
Justice Powell, four members of the court suggested that attenuation was closely
tied to the presence or absence of an intervening factor. As the concurrence notes,
³WKHGHULYDWLYHWDLQWRILOOHJDODFWLYLW\GRHVQRWH[WHQGWRWKHHQGVRIWKHHDUWKEXW
only until it is dissipated by DQLQWHUYHQLQJHYHQW´48 This is a fairly categorical
conclusion which only goes to illustrate how little thought had actually been
given to the attenuation doctrine and the implications of Wong Sun. Clearly,
Wong Sun suggested that lapse of time might be an important factor in evaluating
the presence or absence of attenuation.49 Yet, the concurring justices in
Giordano, including Justice Brennan²the author of the Wong Sun opinion²
said nary a word about lapse of time.50
It is useful to look at the broader legal landscape when exploring the
meaning of attenuation after Wong Sun but before Brown. It may be the case that
Federal and State courts had more expansively examined the concept and had,
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perhaps, found ways to implement it in a factually rich way. Broadly speaking,
it is first worthy of note that there were fairly few cases invoking the attenuation
doctrine decided by the federal circuit courts or state supreme courts from 1963
to 1975. In neither the federal nor state courts were there more than a dozen
reported cases that dealt in depth with the concept. Starting with the federal
courts, we can say, for the most part, that the circuit courts saw attenuation as a
causality issue first and foremost51²with only two or three who even mentioned
linking the concept to remedy and the deterrent goals of the exclusionary rule.52
The federal courts during this time frame also took a stab at identifying
factors that would make attenuation more or less likely. Moving beyond the
broDGIRFXVRQODSVHRIWLPHRUDQ³LQWHUYHQLQJHYHQW´WKHVHFRXUWVORRNHGDW
PRUHVSHFLILFWKLQJVVXFKDV³WKHYROXQWDU\DFWRIDSSHOODQW¶VJRLQJWRWKHFDU
DQGH[SRVLQJLWVFRQWHQWV´WRWKHSROLFH53 or the fact that the suspect decided to
cooperate with the police after consulting with a lawyer who brought him,
voluntarily, to the courthouse to confess.54 When assessing whether the
testimony of a witness that was discovered through illegal police conduct should
be excluded, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals VXJJHVWHGORRNLQJDW³[p]roof
that the witness would have come forward by his own volition, regardless of his
LGHQWLILFDWLRQE\WKHLOOHJDOVHDUFK´ VXJJHVWLQJDWWHQXDWLRQ DQG³HYLGHQFHWKDW
the witness was completely uncooperative when originally discovered by the
illegal search but later changed his attitude and supplied the necessary
LQIRUPDWLRQ´ DOVRVXJJHVWLQJDWWHQXDWLRQ 55 These cases all suggest that what
may be important is not just an intervening event, but one which suggests
voluntary cooperation with the police. This voluntary cooperation could be the
result of any number of factors, but at root, this type of event establishes a causal
break from the original illegality. The subsequent actions by the suspects were
motivated not by the original police conduct, but by other things²some known
and some unknowable.56 This is a purely causal approach and is consistent with
the view that extending the scope of a Fourth Amendment violation should be
primarily driven by causality.

51

E.g., United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 1974).
See Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974); Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190
(9th Cir. 1968).
53
Agius v. United States, 413 F.2d 915, 919 (5th Cir. 1969).
52

54
55

Parker, 498 F.2d at 630.
United States v. Marder, 474 F.2d 1192, 1196 (5th Cir. 1973).

As the Court in Parker REVHUYHG³&DQZHVD\WKDWWKHSUHVVXUHRIWKHFRQIHVVLRQPXVWKDYH
GRPLQDWHG >WKH ZLWQHVV¶V@ FRQVFLHQFH WR FDXVH KLP WR FKDQJH KLV VWRU\" ,Q WKLV RXWUHDFKRI WKH
H[FOXVLRQDU\UXOHZHGHFOLQH3DUNHU¶VLQYLWDWLRQWRVSHFXODWHRQWKHLPSRQGHUDEOHVRIKXPDQ will
DQGPRWLYDWLRQ´Parker, 498 F.2d at 630.
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F. Agius v. United States: Other Factors to Consider

57
58
59

61
62

Agius, 413 F.2d at 920.
Id.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Cephas, 291 A.2d 106, 111 (Pa. 1972).
Id.
People v. Sesslin, 439 P.2d 321, 328 (Cal. 1968).
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These few federal decisions also suggested other things that might matter
when assessing attenuation. For example, in Agius v. United States, the court
suggested the conduct of the police might matter in deciding whether
subsequently discovered incriminating evidence was attenuated from prior,
illegal police conduct.57 $V WKH &RXUW REVHUYHG ³>W@KHUH ZDV QR LQWLPLGDWLRQ
trickery, or cajolery, and the agents in no way induced or caused appellant to
H[SRVHWKHFRQWHQWVRIKLVFDU´58 Why would this matter? Perhaps²sticking to
a causal approach²iWZRXOGEHLPSRUWDQWLQDVVHVVLQJWKH³YROXQWDU\´QDWXUHRI
the intervening event that ostensibly severed the causal chain. Importantly, in
light of what would come later in Brown, the court seemed to focus on police
conduct after the initial illegal custodial interrogation, not the police conduct
during the illegal interrogation.59
Several state supreme courts also addressed the issue of attenuation
between the Wong Sun decision and the later decision in Brown. While the
number of these cases was less than a dozen, these state courts still wrestled with
formulating some sort of test for attenuation and with placing attenuation into
some sort of jurisprudential framework. Some courts readily conceded that
attenuation was a causal concept. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed,
FRPPRQVHQVHDOORZVXVWRILQGWKHSUHVHQFHRUDEVHQFHRI³EXW-IRU´FDXVDWLRQ60
TKHPRUHGLIILFXOWTXHVWLRQLVWKDWRI³SUR[LPDWHFDXVH´$VWKLVFRXUWQRWHGLW
is important to explore the causal explanation for the discovery of the subsequent
incriminating evidence. In this case, a witness, who was illegally arrested and
questioned aIWHU DQ LOOHJDO VHDUFK RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V UHVLGHQFH VXEVHTXHQWO\
voluntarily pled guilty and testified against the defendant. As the Court noted,
³>W@KHSULPDU\TXHVWLRQ . . . when dealing with the taint issue, . . . , is not whether
the witness voluntarily pled guilty and testified, rather it is Why she chose to do
WKLV´61 7KH³ZK\´TXHVWLRQLVDFDXVDOTXHVWLRQDQGRQO\PDNHVVHQVHLQWKDW
light.
Other state courts offered factors to consider when looking for the
presence of attenuation. The California Supreme Court found that the taint of
LOOHJDOSROLFHFRQGXFWFRXOGEHUHPRYHGLIWKHUHZDV³DQLQWHUYHQLQJLQGHSHQGHQW
act by the defendant or a third party which breaks the causal chain linking the
LOOHJDOLW\ DQG WKH HYLGHQFH´62 The Court further noted that consent by the
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defendant could be such an intervening act if it were an act of free will.63 In a
similar vein, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the lapse of time
between the offending police action and the subsequently discovered
incriminating evidence.64 The Court concluded that a lapse of time of only thirty
minutes precluded a finding of attenuation.65
G. Brown v. Illinois: A Test Is Finally Promulgated

63

Id.

64

See Commonwealth v. Knowles, 327 A.2d 19 (Pa. 1974).
Id. at 24.

65
66
67
68
69
70

72
73

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 591 (1975).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Brown, 422 U.S. at 591.
Id. at 591±92.
Id. at 602±03.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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Ultimately, it was left to the Supreme Court to place more definitive
parameters upon the way that attenuation was to be evaluated. These parameters
were articulated in Brown v. Illinois. In Brown the defendant was arrested
without a warrant and without probable cause.66 He was provided the warnings
mandated by Miranda v. Arizona67 and then made two inculpatory statements to
the police.68 The primary focus of the case was whether the inculpatory
statements were attenuated from the illegal arrest because of the Miranda
warnings.69 The Court ultimately concluded that providing the Miranda warning
was not enough to, in and of itself, attenuate the inculpatory statements from the
police misconduct.70 Attenuation and the exclusionary rule are Fourth
Amendment concepts, and the provision of Miranda warnings²and the
exclusion or confessions obtained without these warnings²address Fifth
Amendment concerns.
For our purposes, however, the decision is far more important for the
way in which it establishes a test by which to assess attenuation. The Court
acknowledged that the objective of the attenuation doctrine was to ensure that
the cause of subsequently incriminating evidence was not the prior illegal
conduct of the police.71 As the Court observed, the focus must be on whether the
LQFULPLQDWLQJFRQGXFWRIWKHGHIHQGDQWZDV³VXIILFLHQWO\DSURGXFWRIIUHHZLOO .
. . [to] break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between
WKH LOOHJDOLW\ DQG WKH FRQIHVVLRQ´72 The difficulty is deciding when this has
occurred. The Court observed, first of all, that such a determination is a factual
one that varies from case to case.73 The Court then asserted that constructing a
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test to govern these situations is not easy. ³7KHZRUNLQJVRIWKHKXPDQPLQGDUH
too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection
of the Fourth Amendment to turn on . . DWDOLVPDQLFWHVW´74
The Brown Court then proceeds to set forth three factors, in addition to
the presence or absence of Miranda warnings, which courts should consider
when attempting to decide if subsequent incriminating evidence, such as a
confession, was obtained as a causal product of prior illegal police activity.75
&RXUWVVKRXOGIRFXVRQWKH³WHPSRUDOSUR[LPLW\RIWKHDUUHVWDQGWKHFRQIHVVLRQ
the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and
flagrancy of the RIILFLDO PLVFRQGXFW´76 The Brown Court offered little
elaboration or explanation of these factors. With respect to the third factor, the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, however, the Court did
elaborate. Specifically, the Court observed that in the Brown case, there was an
HOHPHQW RI ³SXUSRVHIXOQHVV´ LQ WKH SROLFH PLVFRQGXFW²suggesting that the
LOOHJDO VWHSV WDNHQ E\ WKHSROLFH ZHUH LQ WKH ³KRSH WKDW VRPHWKLQJ PLJKWWXUQ
XS´77 Beyond that, the Court gave no guidance as to how to evaluate or weigh
the factors suggested nor did it indicate that these tests were designed to get to
the question of causality²or anything else, for that matter. Brown thus gave the
concept of attenuation greater substance than prior cases had, but failed to
articulate a tight, workable test.
H. United States v. Ceccolini: Attenuation Takes a Different Turn

74

Id.

75

Id. at 601±04.
Id. at 603±04.

76
77

79
80

Id. at 605.
435 U.S. 268 (1978).
Id. at 269±70.
Id. at 276.
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The attenuation doctrine took a different turn in the 1978 Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Ceccolini.78 In Ceccolini, an illegal police search led
to the discovery of illegality and this discovery led the police to obtain the
testimony of a witness who was not aware of the illegal conduct in question.79
The District Court suppressed the witnesses testimony because the prosecution
could not show that they would have discovered the witness without the illegal
police conduct. The majority set forth a different test for evaluating live-witness
testimony that resulted from police illegality. The Court asserted that reviewing
courts should focus on the free will exerFLVHGE\WKHZLWQHVVDQGWKHZLWQHVV¶V
willingness to testify.80 $ZLOOLQJZLWQHVV¶VWHVWLPRQ\LVPRUHOLNHO\WKHSURGXFW
of considered reflection and a desire to be cooperative, DQG³WKHLOOHJDOLW\ZKLFK
led to the discovery of the witness very often will not play any meaningful part
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LQWKHZLWQHVV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRWHVWLI\´81Secondly, reviewing courts should focus
on the cost of excluding such testimony given that exclusion of such testimony
ZRXOG³SHUSHWXDOO\GLVDEOHDZLWQHVVIURPWHVWLI\LQJDERXWrelevant and material
facts . . . .´82 The Court pointedly noted that attenuation analysis should focus on
these facts when looking at live-ZLWQHVVWHVWLPRQ\EXWFRXOGIRFXVRQ³GLIIHUHQW
IDFWRUV´ZLWKUHVSHFWWR³LQDQLPDWHHYLGHQFH´83 This approach to live-witness
testimony which results from police illegality is completely devoid of any
reference to causality. Rather, while still ostensibly retaining the attenuation
framework suggested in Brown, both factors suggested by the Court deal with
non-causal concerns such as how much the witness really wanted to cooperate
and how devastating the loss of such testimony might be. This approach does not
view attenuation as a causal construct.
I.

Dunaway v. New York: Repeating Brown

81

Id. at 276±77.

82

Id. at 277.
Id. at 277±78.

83

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 86 Side A

In Dunaway v. New York,84 the court confronted a situation nearly
identical to that in Brown and reached a conclusion nearly identical to the Brown
decision as well. The only real difference was the composition of the Court with
Justice Douglas²in the majority in Brown²replaced by Justice Stevens.85 The
caveats placed on attenuation in the Ceccolini decision were nowhere to be
found, and the simple application of the Brown factors led to a straightforward
conclusion that attenuation did not exist. The only interesting development²
from a causal perspective²ZDV -XVWLFH 6WHYHQV¶ FRQFXUUHQFH There, Stevens
first claimed that the temporal factor set forth in Brown could be viewed in a
different way.86 In Brown, the Court concluded that when little time had elapsed
between illegal police activity and a subsequent incriminating statement by the
defendant, it was fair to conclude that there was a causal link between the two.87
In Dunaway 6WHYHQV REVHUYHG WKDW ³>W@KH WHPSRUDO UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH
arrest and the confession may be an ambiguRXV IDFWRU´88 Stevens goes on to
observe that sometimes prolonged detention may be a means to exploit an illegal
arrest whereas a statement made rapidly after an illegal arrest may be the

84

87
88

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604±05 (1975).
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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86
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85
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FRQVHTXHQFHRIVRPHRWKHUSUHFLSLWDWLQJHYHQWVXFKDVDSUHDUUHVW³visit with a
PLQLVWHU´89
In addition, Stevens contended that the flagrancy of the police conduct
may or may not be relevant in determining the link between the illegal arrest and
the subsequent incriminating statement.90 Where Stevens is on board with the
Brown decision is his belief that these factors are only designed to assist in
assessing the causal relationship between the illegal activity of the police and the
incriminating evidence that followed. As he stated³WKHDGPLVVLELOLW\TXHVWLRQ
will turn on the causal relationship between . . . [the] violation and the
GHIHQGDQW¶VVXEVHTXHQWFRQIHVVLRQ´91 ,Q6WHYHQV¶YLHZWKHFDXVDOLW\TXHVWLRQ
was an objective question and pursuing objective criteria was preferable to a
more subjective quest for an appropriate remedy.92
J. Rawlings v. Kentucky: Giving Meaning to the Brown Factors

89

Id. at 220±21.

90

Id. at 220.
Id.

91
92
93
94
95
96

98
99

Id. at 221.
448 U.S. 98 (1980).
Id. at 107±08.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604±05 (1975).
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 107.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 107.
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Over time, the Brown factors were given additional meaning by the
Supreme Court. In Rawlings v. Kentucky,93 the Court undertook an attenuation
analysis and gave added meaning to the first Brown factor²the lapse of time
between the illegal police conduct and the subsequent discovery of incriminating
evidence.94 In Brown, the lapse of time factor had causal relevance insofar as the
Court concluded that given a short lapse of time between illegal police conduct
and an incriminating statement by the defendant, the statement would likely be
causally attributed to the police conduct in question.95 In Rawlings, the Court
held that lapse of time, in and of itself, was not enough to decide the causal
question, however.96 The defendant was detained at a house by police while they
sought a warrant.97 While never deciding the question of whether the detention
was illegal, the Court went on to examine the subsequent events from a Brown
perspective.98 In particular, the Court examined the 45 minutes that elapsed
EHWZHHQ WKH DOOHJHG LOOHJDO GHWHQWLRQ DQG WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V LQFULPLQDWLQJ
statements.99 Acknowledging that the lapse of time might not be adequate to
³SXUJHWKHWDLQW´WKH&RXUWIHOWLWQHFHVVDU\WRHYDOXDWHWKDWTXHVWLRQLQOLJKWRI

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 87 Side A

 

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹʹ

2021] Ward: Restoring
RESTORING
TO Establishing
ATTENUATION
CausalityCAUSALITY
in Attenuation:
the Breadth of a

163

100
101

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 87 Side A

³WKH SUHFLVH FRQGLWLRQV XQGHU ZKLFK WKH RFFXSDQWV RI WKLV KRXVH ZHUH
GHWDLQHG´100 7KH &RXUW WKHQ SURYLGHG HYLGHQFH WR VXJJHVW WKDW D ³FRQJHQLDO
atmRVSKHUH´H[LVWHGZLWKLQWKHKRXVHGXULQJWKHODSVHRIWLPH101 This congenial
atmosphere, apparently, made all the difference insofar as the Court concluded
WKDW ³WKHVH FLUFXPVWDQFHV RXWZHLJK WKH UHODWLYHO\ VKRUW SHULRG RI WLPH WKDW
elapsed between the initiDWLRQ RI WKH GHWHQWLRQ DQG WKH SHWLWLRQHU¶V
DGPLVVLRQV´102 Why might this be the case, from a causal perspective? Perhaps
this congenial atmosphere suggests that the coercive effect of the police action
was undermined by the subsequent good feeling that existed between the police
and the defendant. Such a conclusion would need to be based on a belief that the
illegal police conduct must be subjectively understood by the suspect as opposed
to objectively recognized after the fact. If a suspect subjectively understands that
SROLFHPLVFRQGXFWKDV RFFXUUHG EXW VRPHKRZ ³IRUJLYHV´LWDV HYLGHQFHGE\D
congenial atmosphere, then a subsequent incriminating statement could not be
causally linked to the misconduct. Presumably, the misconduct was no longer a
factor in mRWLYDWLQJWKHVXVSHFW¶VFRQGXFW
Proceeding on this path has grave dangers. Introducing a subjective
element into any constitutional test is fraught with difficulty, particularly if the
test is fact based. The Court, in nearly all matters pertaining to the Fourth
Amendment, has preferred to stick to an objective test.103 In this case, concluding
WKDW WKH LOOHJDO SROLFH FRQGXFW GLGQ¶W PDWWHU GHVSLWH WKH VKRUW ODSVH RI WLPH
between the police conduct and the incriminating statement, depends upon a
conclusion that the defendant subjectively was not influenced by the original
police conduct because of the subsequent congenial atmosphere. Yet, in this case,
that congenial atmosphere was established by the testimony of others in the
house²not the defendant.104 It is impossible to know what, subjectively, he was
feeling about the police and his detention. To suggest that the subsequent
incriminating statement made by the defendant was not causally linked to his
illegal detention because he seemed to be getting along with the police requires
a degree of speculation which is anathema to causal analysis.
In many ways, the Brown tests are designed to allow for an objective
assessment of causality. By examining lapse of time, intervening factors, and
perhaps even the nature of police conduct, an objective observer of the sequence
of events can reach a rational conclusion as to the causal linkage between the
original police illegality and the incriminating evidence. If we intend to move
EH\RQG³EXW-IRU´FDXVDlity to something more meaningful, we have to find a way

Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.

102
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of doing so that is objectively reasonable²even logical, if you will. We can
never know if the illegal act actually caused the subsequent discovery of
incriminating evidence. We can never know for sure if the illegal act actually
caused the suspect to make an incriminating statement. The best we can do is
objectively examine the facts with the Brown factors in mind and reach a logical
assumption. By interjecting subjectivity into the equation, Rawlings makes that
assumption much less reliable.
K. Segura v. United States: Undermining the Causal Argument
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The strength of the causality justification for the attenuation doctrine was
unexpectedly placed in jeopardy by a dissent in the case of Segura v. United
States.105 In Segura, the majority undertook a brief attenuation examination of
facts surrounding an illegal seizure of a house and a subsequent search warrant
that uncovered incriminating evidence.106 The majority opinion, drafted by Chief
Justice Burger, revealed no new arguments pertaining to attenuation, toed the
line on the causal nature of attenuation, and in fact based this portion of its
opinion on the independent source doctrine more than any attenuation
conclusion.107 The dissent, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice
%UHQQDQ 0DUVKDOO DQG %ODFNPXQ ZKLOH GLVDJUHHLQJ ZLWK WKH PDMRULW\¶V
conclusion, seems to significantly undermine the causal argument attached to
attenuation. As the dissenters, including the very author of the Brown decision,
QRWH³WDLQWTXHVWLRQVGRQRWGHSHQGPHUHO\RQTXHVWLRQVRIFDXVDWLRQFDXVDWLRQ
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for exclusion. In addition, it must be
shown that exclusion is required to remove the incentive for the police to engage
in the uQODZIXOFRQGXFW´108 This argument, in which the remedy appropriate for
such Fourth Amendment violations overrides the logic governing the actual
determination of the violation, is very harmful to the causal argument. No longer
is causation²based on logic²WKHGHWHUPLQLQJIDFWRUIRULVVXHVRI³WDLQW´ Now,
fact-based causation starts the conversation, but the policy-based factor of
deterrence makes the final call. One wonders if this was a conscious choice by
the dissenters or simply a device to attack the result reached by the majority in
Segura.
L. New York v. Harris: Another Vehicle for Attenuation Discussion
A subsequent case, New York v. Harris,109 was a vehicle for further
discussion of the attenuation principle. The case involved an illegal entry by the
468 U.S. 796, 817 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

106

Id. at 798±99.
Id. at 815.

107
108
109

Id. at 830 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
495 U.S. 14 (1990).
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SROLFHLQWRWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VKRPHKLVVXEVHTXHQWDUUHVWDQGVHYHUDOIROORZ-on
statements to the police. The police had probable cause to arrest the defendant
but did so while illegally in his home. At issue was an incriminating statement
made by the defendant at the police station. The majority held that this was not
a situation for which Brown should even apply because, at the time the statement
ZDV PDGH WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V FXVWRG\ ZDV QRW XQODZIXO110 As the Court noted,
³DWWHQXDWLRQ DQDO\VLV LV RQO\ DSSURpriate where, as a threshold matter, courts
GHWHUPLQHWKDWµWKHFKDOOHQJHGHYLGHQFHLVLQVRPHVHQVHWKHSURGXFWRILOOHJDO
JRYHUQPHQWDFWLYLW\¶´111
While there was clearly illegal government activity, the Court concluded
that the statements made subsequently were not a product of that entry, and thus
not subject to attenuation analysis. But surely this begs the question. The purpose
of attenuation analysis is to answer the very question of whether the
incriminating statement was the product of the illegal entry. The majority, by
means of a policy determination, answer that question. As it noted:
[W]e decline to apply the exclusionary rule in this context
because the rule [in Payton v. New York prohibiting an arrest
inside a home without a warrant] was designed to protect the
physical integrity of the home; it was not intended to grant
criminal suspects, like Harris, protection for statements made
outside their premises where the police have probable cause to
arrest the suspect for committing a crime.112

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 88 Side A

This conclusion has nothing to do with causation or attenuation. Justice
Marshall, in his dissent, clearly illustrates the lack of causal analysis in the
majority position.113 The Court, Marshall claims, set forth a per se rule that
concludes categorically that a Payton violation cannot be causally connected to
subsequent incriminating statements.114 $V0DUVKDOOREVHUYHV³>Q@HLWKHUORJLF
QRUSUHFHGHQWVXSSRUWVWKDWFRQFOXVLRQ´115 Rather, as Marshall notes:
[the] question cannot be answered with a set of per se rules. An
LQTXLU\LQWRZKHWKHUDVXVSHFW¶VVWDWHPHQWLVSURSHUO\WUHDWHGDV
DWWULEXWDEOHWRD)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWYLRODWLRQRUWRWKHVXVSHFW¶V
independent act of will has an irreducibly psychological aspect,

110
111
112

114
115

Id. at 17.
Id. at 28 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
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and irrebuttable presumptions are peculiarly unhelpful in such a
context.116
Only by looking at each situation and closely analyzing the impact of the illegal
police activity on the subsequent incriminating conduct of the defendant²as
encouraged by the approach in Brown²may we clearly come to grips with the
attenuation question. 7KH TXHVWLRQ PXVW EH GLG ³WKH DUUHVW >FDXVH@ WKH
VWDWHPHQW"´117
M. Kaupp v. Texas: Drifting Backwards
The Supreme Court seemed to drift back into a more fact-based analysis
of causation over ten years later in Kaupp v. Texas.118 There, confronted with an
DWWHQXDWLRQTXHVWLRQWKH&RXUWUHFLWHGWKHIDPLOLDUUHIUDLQWKDW³ZHOO-established
precedent requires sXSSUHVVLRQRIWKHFRQIHVVLRQXQOHVVWKDWFRQIHVVLRQZDVµDQ
act of free will [sufficient] to purge the primary taint of the unlawful
invasion.¶´119 More importantly, the Court goes on to assert that,
³>G@HPRQVWUDWLQJ VXFK SXUJDWLRQ LV RI FRXUVH D IXQFWLRQ of circumstantial
evidence, with the burden of persuasion on the sWDWH´120 Accepting the factual
nature of the analysis²as opposed to a per se rule approach²the Court then
goes on to apply the factors in Brown to the situation in question.121 This clearly
is a causal approach driven by facts and the inferences that arise from them.
N. Hudson v. Michigan: Jettisoning the Brown Approach

116
117
118
119
120

122
123

Id. at 23.
Id. at 29.
538 U.S. 626 (2003).
Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
Id.
547 U.S. 586 (2006).
Id. at 589.
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Yet, only three years later in Hudson v. Michigan,122 the court seemed to
completely jettison the Brown approach. In Hudson, the police failed to observe
the knock-and-announce policy that had governed the execution of warrants for
hundreds of years.123 The question became whether the evidence seized as a
consequence of the subsequent search should be excluded as the product of the
knock-and-announce violation. The case certainly had a great deal of causal
analysis ramifications²and ambiguities. The majority asserts that even if the
police conduct here were D ³EXW-IRU´ FDXVH RI GLVFRYHULQJ WKH FRQWUDEDQG LQ
question, the attenuation doctrine would negate the causal relationship between

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 89 Side A

 

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹʹ

2021] Ward: Restoring
RESTORING
TO Establishing
ATTENUATION
CausalityCAUSALITY
in Attenuation:
the Breadth of a

167

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 89 Side A

the two.124 Yet, the measure of attenuation used by the majority is novel and
depends little upon the Brown approach. The majority asserts that attenuation
FDQRFFXU³ZKHQWKHFDXVDOFRQQHFWLRQLVUHPRWH´125 That is the end of the causal
approach to attenuation. The majority focuses most of its attenuation analysis on
the claim that attenuation also occurs²even when there is but-for causation²
ZKHQ ³WKH LQWHUHVW SURWHFWHG E\ WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO JXDUDQWHH WKDW Kas been
YLRODWHG ZRXOG QRW EH VHUYHG E\ VXSSUHVVLRQ RI WKH HYLGHQFH REWDLQHG´126
Relying upon the reasoning in New York v. Harris,127 the Court asserts that the
purpose of the knock-and-announce rule is not to shield people from illegal
searches, but rather to protect home residents and the police from the violence
that might result from an abrupt entry into a home.128 Thus, excluding evidence
REWDLQHG IURP DQ LPSURSHU HQWU\ LQWR WKH KRXVH GRHVQ¶W UHDOO\ DGGUHVV WKH
concerns of the knock-and-announce rule.
While LWLVGLIILFXOWWRDUJXHZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJRQWKLVSRLQWLW
does noW UHDOO\ FRQVWLWXWH DQ ³DWWHQXDWLRQ´ DUJXPHQW It is a policy-based
argument that has nothing to do with the causal link between the illegal police
conduct and the subsequent discovery of incriminating evidence. Attenuation
should always be viewed as a causal concept. As such, the only question becomes
whether the circumstances are such as to suggest that the illegal police activity
did not (really) cause the subsequent discovery of the incriminating evidence.
The majority blurs the purpose of attenuation with this new approach. What is
surprising is that, only a few pages later, the majority acknowledges that
attenuation is different from the need for the deterrent value of exclusion to
outweigh the costs.129 $VWKH&RXUWVWDWHV³>T@XLWHDSDUWIURPWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRI
XQDWWHQXDWHG FDXVDWLRQ´ WKH H[FOXVLRQDU\ UXOH KDV QRW EHHQ DSSOLHG ZKHQ WKH
deterrent value outweighs the social cost.130 Linking attenuation with causation
in WKLV VWDWHPHQW VHHPV WR XQGHUPLQH WKH PDMRULW\¶V RZQ FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW
attenuation is also a policy-based determination pertaining to the underlying
purpose of the constitutional protection.
7KLV FRQIXVLRQ LV H[DFHUEDWHG E\ -XVWLFH .HQQHG\¶V FRQFXUUHQFH
Focusing solely on causation and ignoring remedy, Justice Kennedy concludes
that the subsequent discovery of the incriminating evidence was too attenuated
because failing to pause for 20 seconds cannot cause the discovery of evidence

124

Id. at 592.
Id. at 593. Interestingly, the majority cites the old Nardone case to justify this conclusion
rather than the classic attenuation cases of Wong Sun or Brown.
126
Id.
125

127

129
130

495 U.S. 14 (1990).
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594.
Id.
Id.
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uncovered after a five-hour search.131 It is hard to say why not²Justice Kennedy
certainly does not. The only clue is found a few paragraphs later where Justice
.HQQHG\VWDWHV³WKHUHOHYDQWHYLGHQFHZDVGLVFRYHUHGQRWEHFDXVHRIDIDLOXUH
to knock and announce, but because of a subsequent search pursuant to a lawful
ZDUUDQW´132 This claim is surely a but-for causal claim closely akin to the
inevitable discovery rule or the independent source doctrine. Nothing in this
conclusion suggests that attenuation²as defined by Wong Sun and systematized
by Brown²UHDOO\ GHVFULEHV -XVWLFH .HQQHG\¶V YLHZ The discovery of the
evidence in this case was not coupled with an extensive lapse in time between
illegal activity and discovery, there was no intervening event which might
account for the discovery of the evidence, and the flagrant nature of the police
conduct was not even at issue. This lack of doctrinal precision when it comes to
causal analysis, and attenuation in particular, has consistently plagued the
&RXUW¶VGRFWULQH
And so, on the eve of the most recent and, perhaps, the most significant
attenuation case²Utah v. Strieff²ZHILQGWKH&RXUW¶VDWWHQXDWLRQGRFWULQHWREH
a bit of a puzzle. After progressing from a single sentence in Nardone to a more
formal doctrine in Brown, the ensuing years have seen a Court torn between
conflicting and sometimes logically inconsistent approaches. As we have seen,
the Court in Kaupp applied the Brown test to the facts and fairly easily dispatched
the case. Only three years later, the Court asserts that attenuation applies, but
then fails to even mention Brown. Mixed in, throughout the years, are Supreme
Court opinions that struggle to articulate a consistent causation-based narrative
as to why the evidence discovered was or was not a product of the original Fourth
Amendment violation. Sometimes the Court toed the causal line and concluded
that the evidence discovered was not a product of the original police conduct
because the causal link between the illegal police conduct and the acquisition of
the incriminating evidence is too attenuated based on lapse of time, intervening
factors, etc. Other times, the Court declined to find such a causal link for purely
policy-based reasons. Using policy to define remedy is fine, but it should not be
the basis for establishing and applying a fact-based causality analysis. Perhaps
now is a good time to discuss causality and the logic behind the attenuation rule.
ATTENUATION AS CAUSATION

Any discussion of attenuation and its causal origins starts with the simple
necessity of a Fourth Amendment violation. When police engage in conduct
contrary to the Fourth Amendment, be it an illegal entry, search of a vehicle, or
detention of an individual, there are two broad potential consequences. First, the
illegal police action could lead to no incriminating evidence, and the suspect is
free to carry on his life with no criminal consequences. Second, the illegal police

132

Id. at 603±04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 604.
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action could lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence of some sort with a
subsequent criminal prosecution based solely or in part upon the incriminating
evidence discovered. In the second case, the concept of causation helps us to
establish a clear linkage between the police action and the evidence
discovered.133 After this linkage has been established, the obvious question
becomes²what do we do about this? For the majority of our existence as an
independent republican democracy, the remedy was some sort of civil lawsuit
designed to hold the individual police officers accountable for their actions.134
This civil remedy is still viewed to be the solution to the first type of Fourth
Amendment violation²that which leads to no incriminating evidence.135 By the
20th century, however, this civil remedy for the second type of Fourth
Amendment violation²that which led to the discovery of incriminating
evidence²was replaced with a remedy of greater consequence.
In Weeks v. United States136 and Mapp v. Ohio,137 the Supreme Court
articulated a remedy for such situations that we refer to as the exclusionary rule.
The rule is perhaps most concisely articulated by the Court in Mapp which held
WKDW ³DOO HYLGHQFH REWDLQHG E\ VHDUFKHV DQG VHL]XUHV LQ YLRODWLRQ RI WKH
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible.´138 Contained within this
simple proposition is a causal reality. In order for the evidence obtained to be
IRXQG LQDGPLVVLEOH LW PXVW KDYH EHHQ ³REWDLQHG E\ VHDUFKHV DQG VHL]XUHV LQ
YLRODWLRQ RI WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ´ In this context, obtained means that the illegal
police conduct caused the discovery of the evidence. A rudimentary definition of
FDXVHVXJJHVWVWKDWLWLV³WKDWZKLFKSURGXFHVDQHIIHFW´139 $VHDV\DV³FDXVHDQG
HIIHFW´PD\EHIRUXVWRXQGHUVWDQGIURPDSKLORVRSKLFDODQGDOHJDOSHUVSHFWLYH
the concept is more complex.
Philosophical notions of causation attempt to produce broad
generalizations about how the world works by relying upon scientific
observation in the hopes of establishing how broad classes of events are
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 90 Side A

133
In general, as noted by Kenneth S. Abraham, ³causation is a conclusion we reach when we
expect a certain consequence to follow a certain antecedent and we have what we consider a tenable
explanation for this relationship between an antecedent and a subsequent event.´ .HQQHWK 6
Abraham, Self-Proving Causation, 99 VA. L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2013). +HFRQWLQXHV³The more
reliable the explanation has been in the past that a particular subsequent event will follow a
particular antecedent, and the more coherent the explanation for this relationship, the more
convincing is the conclusion that the antecedent cause the consequence.´ Id.
134
See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 786
(1994).
135
See William Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 621 (1975).
136

138
139

232 U.S. 383 (1914).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 655.
Cause, THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1993).
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connected.140 Legal notions of causation, however, are more focused.141 As noted
E\ +DUW DQG +RQRUp ³WKH ODZ\HU . . . [is] primarily concerned to make causal
statements about particulars, to establish that on some particular occasion some
particular occurrence was the effect or consequence of some other particular
RFFXUUHQFH´142 This concern by lawyers finds expression in the law of torts,
criminal law, contracts, and many other areas.143 It is in the law of torts that we
find the most extensive discussions of causation as it relates to the law of
negligence.
In the law of negligence, even when the defendant has breached a clear
duty of care to the plaintiff, she will only be held liable if this negligent action
(or omission) caused the injuries suffered.144 Thus, establishing causation is of
primary concern for courts examining these situations. It is all too easy to fall
into the logical trap of the post hoc ergo propter hoc manner of examining
causation.145 This logical fallacy would suggest that because the injury came after
the GHIHQGDQW¶VDFWLRQVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VDFWLRQVPXVWKDYHFDXVHGWKHLQMXU\LQ
question. Clearly, this is not the case²but deciding when causation does exist
has been no easy proposition.
A. But-For Causation
The first form of causation typically referenced is that referred to as
³FDXVDWLRQLQIDFW´RU³EXW-IRUFDXVDWLRQ´146 7KH³FODVVLFWHVWIRUGHWHUPLQLQJ
FDXVHLQµIDFW¶GLUHFWVWKHµIDFWILQGHU¶WRFRPSDUHZKDWGLGRFFXUZLWKZKDWZRXOG
have occurred if hypothetical, contrary-to-IDFW FRQGLWLRQV KDG H[LVWHG´147 In
other words, the sequence of events that actually occurred²including, for
example, the injury suffered by the plaintiff²ZRXOGQRWKDYHRFFXUUHG³EXW-IRU´
the action of the defendant that set the sequence of events into motion.
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 90 Side B

140

H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 9 (1959).
It can be argued, however, that this focus can distort the meaning. As noted by Michael S.
Moore, ³[i]t is of course possible that although the law uses the word µcause,¶ it does not refer to
causal relation.´MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2009). ³It is possible, in
other words, that what these doctrines call causation has nothing to do with causation as a real
relation in the world; rather, the possibility is that here as elsewhere the law uses a word in a
technical, distinctly legal sense, even though the word already has an established meaning in nonlegal English.´Id. In this Article, we will argue for the definition of causation to be that of a realworld concept and not just a legal one.
142
HART & HONORÉ, supra note 140, at 8±9.
141

143
144

Id. at 79.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984).

146
147

KEETON ET AL. supra note 144, § 30.
Id. at § 41.
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See Richard H. Underwood, Logic and the Common Law Trial, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
151, 1175±78 (1994).
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But-for causation is recognized as significant in the SuprHPH &RXUW¶V
discussion of when to view subsequently discovered incriminating evidence as
the consequence of prior police Fourth Amendment violations. The Court
repeatedly refers to but-for causation as a basis for deciding if the illegal actions
of the police caused the eventual discovery of incriminating evidence but also
typically concludes that but-for causation is not enough to establish an actionable
causal link between the two events.148 This reluctance to accept but-for causation
as the defining test for establishing a true causal link is perhaps best articulated
in Ceccolini ZKHUH WKH &RXUW REVHUYHG ³>H@YHQ LQ VLWXDWLRQV ZKHUH WKH
H[FOXVLRQDU\UXOHLVSODLQO\DSSOLFDEOHZHKDYHGHFOLQHGWRDGRSWDµSHUVH¶RU
µEXWIRU¶UXOHWKDWZRXOGPDNHLQDGPLVsible any evidence, whether tangible or
live-witness testimony, which somehow came to light through a chain of
FDXVDWLRQWKDWEHJDQZLWKDQLOOHJDODUUHVW´149
Given this position by the Court, it might be fair to ask if but-for
causation has any role to play in linking illegal acts with subsequently discovered
evidence? The Court in Hudson VSHOOHG RXW WKH UROH WKDW ³EXW-IRU´ FDXVDWLRQ
SOD\V QRWLQJ ³H[FOXVLRQ PD\ QRW EH SUHPLVHG RQ WKH PHUH IDFW WKDW D
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOYLRODWLRQZDVDµEXW-IRU¶FDXVHRIREWDLning evidence. Our cases
show that but-for causality is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for
VXSSUHVVLRQ´150 As such, we can view but-for causation as a rule of limitation.
Without but-for causation, the necessary causal link is not established because
WKH LOOHJDO DFWLYLW\ RI WKH SROLFH ZDV QRW HYHQ D UXGLPHQWDU\ ³FDXVH´ RI WKH
discovery of the incriminating evidence²and thus the evidence was not
³REWDLQHG´E\VHDUFKHVDQGVHL]XUHVWKDWYLRODWHGWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ
Aside from the obvious situation in which the illegal conduct by the
police has no relationship at all with the subsequently discovered incriminating
evidence, but-for causation still plays a role in two complex situations which
have led to the promulgation of two specific rules or doctrines to govern its
absence. The first, the independent source rule, was first articulated as an
exception to the Fourth Amendment by Justice Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States.151 There, Justice Holmes noted that, when there has been a
constiWXWLRQDOYLRODWLRQE\WKHSROLFHLWGRHVQRWPHDQWKDW³IDFWVWKXVREWDLQHG
become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others . . . .´152 Thus, as the
Court observed in Nix v. Williams ³>W@KH LQGHSHQGHQW VRXUFH GRFWULQH DOORZV

148
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17
(1990); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,106
(1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603
(1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487±88 (1963).
149

151
152

Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276.
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592.
251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Id. at 392.
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admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of
DQ\FRQVWLWXWLRQDOYLRODWLRQ´153 This conclusion makes perfect causal sense.154 If
WKHLOOHJDOFRQGXFWRIWKHSROLFHZDVQRWWKH³EXW-fRU´FDXVHRIWKHGLVFRYHU\RI
the incriminating evidence, then no Fourth Amendment violation has occurred.
In the case of the independent source doctrine, the discovery of the evidence was
not caused by the illegal police conduct if other, perfectly legal, police activity
uncovered the evidence in question.155
Similarly, the Court has also promulgated the inevitable discovery rule
DV D VHFRQG ³EXW-IRU´ FDXVDWLRQ WHVW When the discovery of incriminating
evidence would have inevitably occurred without police misconduct, the fact that
it was originally obtained by illegal activity is not a Fourth Amendment violation
that requires its exclusion.156 )URPWKH³EXW-IRU´FDXVDOSHUVSHFWLYHLILWFDQEH
clearly proved that the evidence would have been uncovered anyway, it can be
DUJXHG WKDW WKH RULJLQDO SROLFH PLVFRQGXFW ZDV QRW WKH ³EXW-IRU´ FDXVH RI WKH
discovery of the evidence. Thus, there is no causal link between the Fourth
Amendment violation, and the evidence and exclusion would not be appropriate.
Aside from the independent source rule and the inevitable discovery
doctrine, however, but-for causation fails to adequately assist our causal analysis
of those more complex situations involving the indirect discovery of evidence.
The fundamental factual question posed in all Fourth Amendment cases is
whether the police actions²which violated the Fourth Amendment²caused the
discovery of the incriminating evidence. For many scenarios, the answer is
obvious. The Supreme Court has had no difficulty in concluding that a Fourth
Amendment violation has occurred when evidence is directly discovered as a
result of police illegality.157 Thus, it is not too difficult to conclude that evidence
discovered on the person of a suspect immediately after an illegal arrest was
directly a result of the illegal actions taken by the police. Nothing in this fact
pattern demands any conclusion as to what the appropriate remedy for such a
violation should be. Reaching a conclusion on causation is more difficult when
the evidence is indirectly related to the conduct of the police. For example, the
police arrest a suspect without probable cause, and at some later time, the
defendant, apparently of his own volition, confesses to the crime. Did the illegal
arrest cause the confession? Our problems with indirectly discovered evidence
arise when²utilizing our common sense²we have difficulty believing that the
police misconduct in question really was the cause of the subsequent discovery

153

156
157

Williams, 467 U.S. at 443±44.
Segura, 468 U.S. at 805.
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467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
Despite the common-sense nature of the independent source doctrine, the Supreme Court
has struggled to separate the concept from the attenuation doctrine. Thus, in the Segura case, the
court notes the 60-year history of the attenuation doctrine only to then suggest that the independent
source doctrine is an example of attenuation. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984).
155
See MACLIN, supra note 15, at 282.
154
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of evidence. This disbelief may be due to the fact that other explanations for the
VXVSHFW¶VFRQGXFWXQUHODWHGWRWKHSULRUSROLFHDFWLRQVDUHWKHWUXHH[SODQDWLRQ
While the Court in Wong Sun held that the exclusionary rule applies to
both directly and indirectly discovered evidence,158 its subsequent ruling
evidences profound unease with concluding that a causal relationship exists in
DOO LQVWDQFHV RI LQGLUHFWO\ GLVFRYHUHG HYLGHQFH ZKHUH VRPH IRUP RI ³EXW-IRU´
causation exists. Hence, the attenuation rule exists. Attenuation is the causal
mechanism by which the Court has answered the common-sense question posed
above²did the police conduct really cause the subsequent discovery of the
incriminating evidence. If the causal relationship between the evidence
discovered and the police misconduct is too attenuated, then there really is not a
causal relationship at all. Attenuation has evolved very slowly as a concept (as
we have seen in the discussion above) and has suffered at the hands of those who
wish to equate it with proximate cause²a concept similar to attenuation utilized
in the context of the civil law of torts.
B. Proximate Cause vs. Attenuation
Proximate cause is a concept that has flummoxed law students and
lawyers for nearly a century. $OVRNQRZQDV³OHJDOFDXVH´LQtorts, it is used as a
mechanism for limiting the reach of the law. From a pragmatic and equitable
perspective, courts have had difficulty in imposing liability for negligence to
conduct that indirectly produces injuries in unusual and unexpected ways.
5HO\LQJRQ³EXW-IRU´FDXVDWLRQDORQHZRXOGQRWDddress these concerns. Hence,
proximate cause²a policy-based approach to limiting liability.159 As the
preeminent hornbook in tort law has observed:
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 92 Side A

Proximate cause is merely the limitation which the courts have
SODFHGXSRQWKHDFWRU¶Vresponsibility for the consequences of
WKH DFWRU¶V FRQGXFW . . . [a]s a practical matter, legal
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
closely connected with the result and of such significance that
the law is justified in imposing liability.160
Using proximate cause as a rule of limitation is pragmatic, but it moves the
discussion from the realm of causation to that of policy. As we will see, this

158

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

C M
Y K

27

11/16/2021 08:40:42

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
The deployment of causal language here falsely suggests some scientific
rationale for these normative decisions and obscured their real basis: namely,
the determination that the relevant consequences of the wrongdoing full
outside the scope of liability that was judged appropriate for the particular legal
rule in the light of its purpose.
Jane Stapleton, Causation in the Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION 744, 754 (Helen
Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, & Peter Menzies eds., 2012).
160
KEETON ET AL., supra note 144, § 41.
159
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policy-EDVHG DSSURDFK KDV JDLQHG DVFHQGHQF\ ZLWKLQ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V
discussion of attenuation, but it is not at all clear that attenuation in the context
of Fourth Amendment violations was intended to evolve from a tool for causal
analysis to an explanation for policy choices, nor is it clear that such a deviation
is wise.
Perhaps, it could be argued, proximate cause based on policy is the
reality and attenuation as a causal concept is a pipedream. This would be true if
there were no alternative to equating attenuation with the proximate cause
notions of modern torts. However, Hart and Honoré contend that it is still
logically consistent to adhere to the requirement of causation as the sole measure
of the imposition of liability²even in situations of unusual and unexpected tort
injuries. As they note, causal questions are questions of fact, anG³WKHFULWHULDIRU
GHFLGLQJ WKHP >LV@ WR EH GUDZQ IURP FRPPRQ VHQVH´161 This then begs the
question of what to do in complex situations, not only those involving
complicated allegations of negligence, but also with situations in which evidence
is indirectly obtained after police misconduct. +RZFDQ³FRPPRQVHQVH´KHOSXV
limit the reach of unconstitutional taint? Hart and Honoré confront this situation
as well by observing that even in these complex situations the legal system
should avoid reliance on expedLHQFHRUQRWLRQVRI³MXVWLFH´DQGVLPSO\DVN³KRZ
OLNHRUXQOLNHWKHVWDQGDUGFOHDUFDVHWKHSUHVHQWGHEDWDEOHFDVHLV´162 In other
words, perhaps reliance on facts is not as difficult as we might think. Factfinders
FDQUHO\XSRQIDFWVDQG³ZKDWZDVDVVXPHG, rightly or wrongly, to be part of the
RUGLQDU\ PDQ¶V VWRFN RI JHQHUDO QRWLRQV´163 7KLV QRWLRQ RI ³FRPPRQ VHQVH´
driving causal conclusions finds support in the very first attenuation case,
Nardone v. United States. There, Justice Frankfurter observed that when
DVVHVVLQJ WKH OLPLWV RI FDXVDO FRQQHFWLRQV ZH VKRXOG EH DEOH WR ³UHO\ RQ WKH
OHDUQLQJJRRGVHQVHIDLUQHVVDQGFRXUDJHRIIHGHUDOWULDOMXGJHV´164 This faith
in judicial fact finders is reiterated in Brown.165

162
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HART & HONORÉ, supra note 140, at 86.
Id. at 87.

164
165

Nardone II, 308 U.S. 338, 342 (1939).
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 n.10 (1975).
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163
Id. at 86; see also 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 89 (1959). The extent to
which we believe that ³common sense´ is a product of experience. Hume asserts, ³$ll causal
inferences depend, in one way or another, on experience of causal conjunctions. Following
experience in which objects or events of one kind are generally or always followed by objects or
events of another kind, the mind develops, through µcustom or habit,¶ a propensity to form an µidea¶
of an object or event of one of these kinds upon having a µperception¶ (which is itself either an
µimpression¶ or an idea) of an object or event of another.´ Id.; see also Don Garrett, Hume, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note 159, at 73, 75.
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C. Brown and Defining Attenuation
Even assuming that common sense notions of relationships and factual
causation can adequately address the difficulties associated with drawing a
causal linkage in complex situations of evidence resulting indirectly from illegal
police conduct, it would still be useful to provide some factual guides to assist
the factfinder in reaching his or her conclusions. The slow evolution of the
concept of attenuation in the context of Fourth Amendment violations attempts
to assist in this process. The seminal case of Brown v. Illinois provides a partially
effective way to examine the facts of a given case so as to establish or refute a
causal link between the illegal police conduct and the subsequently discovered
evidence.166 Two of the three Brown IDFWRUVFRPSRUWZLWKRXU³FRPPRQVHQVH´
notions of causality.167
1. Temporal Proximity
The first factor, the lapse of time between the offending conduct and the
discovery of the incriminating evidence, comports most obviously with the lay
definition of attenuation.168 $VGHILQHGDWWHQXDWLRQLVWKH³SURFHVVRIZHDNHQLQJ
DVLIE\GLOXWLRQ´RU³GLPLQXWLRQRIFKDUDFWHULVWLFIRUFH´169 Common sense would
VXJJHVWWKDWDFDXVDOOLQNFDQ³ZHDNHQ´RUGLPLQLVKLQIRUFHRYHUWLPH170 As in
Wong SunWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VUHDVRQV for returning to the police station and making
an incriminating statement several days after the illegal police conduct would
suggest that the import of the police contact had likely diminished or weakened
such that it was likely that something else motivDWHGWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFW171
On the other hand, if a defendant is illegally arrested without probable cause and
interrogated soon thereafter, as in Kaupp v. Texas, the confession that was
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 93 Side A

166

Id. passim.

167

For purposes of our further discussion, we will not consider Miranda warnings as part of
the ³test´ set forth in Brown. It is true that the Brown Court concluded that the ³Miranda warnings
are an important factor . . . in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an
illegal arrest´ Id. at 603. However, the significance of Miranda warnings in subsequent cases is
de minimis, and it fails to fit well in a causal framework in which the discovery of the incriminating
evidence is unrelated to a confession.
168

Temporal proximity is also consistent with David Hume¶s notion of causation and
contiguity. For Hume, contiguity implied not only spatial proximity but also closeness in time.
This contiguity was vital, as Hume noted, ³[w]e may therefore consider the relation of contiguity
as essential to that of causation´HUME, supra note 163, at 78±79.
169

Attenuation, THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 139.
It is worth mentioning that lapse of time²or absence of temporal proximity²is a factor
typically examined when addressing proximate cause in torts cases. Judge Andrews, in his famous
dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., points to this factor as one that courts must
consider when deciding to extend liability to atypical situations. 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928).
171
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963).
170
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obtained within an hour or so was one where the impact of the police misconduct
had certainly not weakened or diminished.172 Thus, no attenuation occurred and
the causal linkage survived. The temporal proximity test set forth in Brown is
consistent with our common-sense appraisal of these types of situations. The
more time that elapses, the weaker the influence of the police misconduct on the
GHIHQGDQW¶V EHKDYLRU DQG WKH OHVV OLNHO\ it is that this conduct caused the
subsequent confession.173
2. Intervening Event
The second test offered in Brown requires reviewing courts to determine
LI VRPH ³LQWHUYHQLQJ FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ FRXOG PRUH DFFXUDWHO\ H[SODLQ WKH
GHIHQGDQW¶VFRQIHVVLRQUDWKHUWKDQWKHOLQJHULQJLQIOXHQFHRIWKHLOOHJDOSROLFH
conduct.174 Obviously, a number of intervening circumstances can transpire
between illegal police conduct and a subsequent confession. A defendant might
ask for a glass of water, might be given the opportunity to make a phone call,
have a bite to eat, etc. What we are looking for are intervening factors that could
account for the actions of the defendant. Particularly, if we believe that
confessing to a crime is not something that all defendants will do automatically,
we are looking for circumstances that might explain actions taken by a defendant
that might not be in their best interests.175 Thus, as the Court stated in Giordano,
³WKHderivative taint of illegal activity does not extend to the ends of the earth but
RQO\XQWLOLWLVGLVVLSDWHGE\DQLQWHUYHQLQJHYHQW´176 Characterizing the types of
intervening factors that would satisfy the Brown test is difficult. Both Brown and
Barry v. New Jersey cite Johnson v. Louisiana as an example of a situation in

172
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Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003).
As mentioned earlier, Justice Stevens, in Dunaway v. New York, argued that the temporal
factor was too subjective. 442 U.S. 200, 220 (1979). It could be argued that when there is a lengthy
delay between illegal police conduct and a subsequent police interrogation, the impact of delay
coupled with the lingering memory of the police misconduct may combine to make the causal
relationship between the police misconduct and the confession even greater than if the confession
had taken place immediately. Similarly, an immediate confession could be due to a prearrest event,
such as a meeting with a minister, and not causally related to the police misconduct at all. Id. While
this may be true as speculation, if we view common sense causality as being established by
probabilities, Justice Stevens¶ examples may be outliers that do not inform the general discussion.
173

174
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Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).
While this discussion of intervening circumstances is squarely within the broader concept
of attenuation according to Brown, the Court in United States v. Crews seems to suggest that an
inquiry about an intervening circumstance is somehow separate from the notion of attenuation. As
the Court states, ³the question before the court is whether the chain of causation proceeding from
the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been interrupted by some intervening
circumstance so as to remove the µtaint¶ imposed upon that evidence by the original illegality.´
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980) (emphasis added). This only illustrates the
struggle the Court has had with applying a purely causal concept to fact patterns of this type.
176
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 554 (1974).
175
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which an intervening factor severed the causal link between the illegal police
conduct and the subsequent confession.177 Regrettably, Johnson is a poor vehicle
for clarifying what types of intervening factors can sever causality and thus
support a conclusion that the link between police conduct and incriminating
evidence is attenuated.178
In Taylor v. Alabama,179 the Court provided some guidance by at least
indicating the kinds of intervening events that would not dissipate the taint. In
Taylor, the defendant was arrested illegally and subsequently confessed.180 The
state pointed to a brief meeting between the defendant and his girlfriend and a
male companion.181 Immediately after the meeting, the defendant recanted his
prior denials and confessed to the crime.182 The state argued, not unreasonably,
that this meeting was pivotal in severing the causal link between the illegal arrest
and the subsequent confession. 7KH &RXUW KRZHYHU IRXQG WKH VWDWH¶V FODLPV
³GXELRXV´183 7KH&RXUWQRWHGWKDWWKHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
girlfriend became upset when she heard the officers advise the defendant to
cooperate²which, to the Court, was evidence that the visit would more likely
have led the defendant to refuse to cooperate, not confess.184 One would have
thought that a meeting with a loved one followed by a complete change of heart
with respect to cooperation would lead one to conclude that this event was
significant²even pivotal²LQDFFRXQWLQJIRUWKHGHIHQGDQW¶s behavior. Taylor,
however, leaves us confused.
We could turn to tort law and criminal law to explore how the concept
of an intervening circumstance affects the causal link between an original action

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 94 Side A
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Barry v. New Jersey, 454 U.S. 1017, 1020 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); Brown, 422 U.S.
at 603±04.
178

Johnson is a case primarily dealing with Louisiana¶s jury trial rules which permitted a nonunanimous verdict. Johnson also alleged that he was arrested illegally and that a subsequent lineup
identification should have been suppressed. The majority implied that the fact that Johnson
appeared before a magistrate after his illegal arrest and was advised of his rights somehow
dissipated the taint of the illegal arrest. The Court never elaborated on this point, and it is hard, in
retrospect, to understand how a common sense understanding of causality would find that this
appearance severed the causal link between the illegal arrest and the subsequent lineup. These
cases in which the incriminating evidence is not supplied by the defendant directly are particularly
difficult to square with the attenuation approach established in Wong Sun and Brown. Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972).
179
180
181

183
184

Id. at 691.
Id.
Id. at 691±92.
Id.
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457 U.S. 687 (1982).
Id. at 689.
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and an ultimate result.185 One must be wary, however, of the inclination of tort
law (and to some extent, criminal law) to view proximate cause not as a true
casual concept, but rather a sorting mechanism to limit the extent of liability.
Such an approach may not offer explanations of intervening circumstances that
are consistent with a purely causal approach.186 Tort law examines intervening
circumstances to determine whether the factor in question is a superseding cause.
A superseding cause is one whicKLQWRUWVWHUPLQRORJ\³LVWKHRQO\SUR[LPDWH
FDXVHEHFDXVHLWLVWKHHIILFLHQWRULPPHGLDWHFDXVH´187 This definition appears
to define one amorphous concept with another that is perhaps just as amorphous.
An efficient cause is undefined and defining a superseding cause as one that is
immediate inserts a temporal aspect to the quotient, which fails to assist us much
at all. As one commentator on the law of torts has observed, the explanations of
VXSHUVHGLQJFDXVHV³H[SUHVVFRQFOXVLRQVEXWQRQHRIWKHPRIfers either reasons
RUJXLGDQFHWRODZ\HUV´188 Perhaps even more troubling is the tendency of tort
law to focus almost exclusively on the issue of foreseeability. As we will see
later in this discussion, foreseeability is not a causal concept and thus adds
nothing to a discussion of what factors sever a causal linkage.189
Regrettably, criminal law is of no greater assistance to us. As a first step,
criminal law often distinguishes between intervening circumstances that are
coincidences from those that are a reVSRQVH WR D GHIHQGDQW¶V SULRU DFWLRQ190
Criminal law tends to limit liability for a defendant whose actions are interrupted
by a coincidence as opposed to one whose actions brought others into play²and
they cause harm to the victim.191 Yet, this is not definitive. Do all coincidental
intervening circumstances sever the causal link between the original actor and
the ultimate result? The best that criminal law can tell us is²not necessarily²
and only when the intervening circumstance has a significance or impact that is
³PRUHWKDQDFRQFXUULQJFDXVH´192 This also is of little assistance. A concurring
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 94 Side B
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Tort law often points to the Palsgraf case and Judge Andrews¶ dissent as a source of law for
the belief that intervening circumstances matter when trying to establish proximate cause. Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928).
186
As Dan B. Dobbs asserts in The Law of Torts, the ³real reason to relieve the defendant of
liability is not merely that a new cause has intervened but rather that the risk represented is not one
that the defendant negligently created.´ DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 471 (2000) (emphasis
added). The problem in what appears to be an imminently sensible statement is the implication that
the reason the defendant is not liable is not because of a lack of causation as much as a need to
relieve defendant of liability. Id. Causality defines liability; it is not a sorting rule to limit liability
for some other purpose. Id.
187
188
189

191
192

See infra Part VI.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 364±65 (5th ed. 2010).
Id. at 365.
Id. at 364.
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Id. at 461.
Id.
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cause is, ostensibly, one that is associated with the original cause or simply a
cause that occurs within a window of temporal proximity with the original cause
such that they are seen as acting together. In either case, being able to assess
when the concurring (intervening) cause is more significant than the original
cause²and thus severs the causal connection with the original event²is an
exercise in unguided judgment.
A final potential source of enlightenment may be the practices of federal
and state courts that attempt to apply the test in Brown to day-to-day facts
brought before them. What quickly becomes apparent is that very few cases
involve situations in which the attenuation claimed by the state is due to the
presence of an intervening circumstance. In those instances where courts do
examine alleged intervening circumstances, they nearly always fail to provide
any explanation or definition of what constitutes an intervening circumstance of
such significance as to attenuate the subsequent incriminating evidence from the
illegal police conduct. Rather, the courts tend to simply conclude that an event
was an intervening circumstance without really establishing why.193
Unfortunately, one of the few attempts to articulate a reason why a
particular event would be an intervening circumstance sheds little light. In United
States v. Smith,194 the court indicated that an intervening circumstance can be
characterized as oQHWKDWJLYHVDVXVSHFWWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WR³SDXVHDQGUHIOHFW´195
Thus, the simple act of reading the consent to search form to the suspect followed
by a single question by the suspect was enough to constitute an intervening
circumstance because the suspect was given the opportunity to pause and reflect
before eventually consenting to the search.196 The first problem here is that the
court seems to be conflating the temporal proximity test with the intervening
circumstance test. The reason to focus on temporal proximity is the commonsense belief that as time passes the immediacy of the illegal police conduct
GLVVLSDWHV DQG LW LV OLNHO\ WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V UHDO UHDVRQ IRU DVVLVWLQJ LQ
providing incriminating evidence is due to a conscious decision predicated on

195
196

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
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193
For example, courts have held that providing advice to a suspect of his or her right to refuse
to consent to a search acts as an intervening circumstance. United States v. Moreno, 280 F.2d 898
(8th Cir. 2002); State v. Bray, 902 N.W.2d 98 (Neb. 2017). In addition, the opportunity for legal
consultation may be an intervening circumstance. Bray, 902 N.W.2d at 98. Other courts have
observed that the termination of unlawful detention, presenting the detainee with new evidence, or
evidence that the defendant intended to turn himself in can all be viewed as intervening
circumstances. State v. Shaw, 207 A.3d 299 (N.J. 2019). Courts have noted that an independent
criminal act may be an intervening circumstance. State v. Tapia, 414 P.3d 332 (N.M. 2018).
Finally, of course, several courts have held that the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant acts
as an intervening circumstance. E.g., Sizer v. State, 174 A.3d 326 (Md. 2017). A further discussion
of this latter point, in the context of the Supreme CoXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQUtah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct.
2056 (2016), will be discussed in much greater detail infra at Part IV.B.
194
919 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019).
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199
200

Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062±63.
Id. at 2062.
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984).
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062±63.
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reflection. Reflection is a temporal factor, yet the Smith court asserts that reflect
is the consequence of some event rather than the passage of time. Secondly, there
is certainly no guarantee that the administrative actions taken by the police in
this case had any causal relevance at all. To assume that hearing a form being
read out loud and asking questions about it demonstrates that the suspect had
³SDXVHGDQGUHIOHFWHG´LVDVNLQJDELWPXFK Thus, without more, the intervening
circumstance test makes logical sense but is poorly defined by the courts that
have applied it.
Ultimately, it is simply the case that we must rely upon the commonsense notions of the finders of fact to determine if the intervening event is so
significant as to negate the causal linkage between the original police misconduct
and the subsequently discovered incriminating evidence. That approach,
KRZHYHU UXQV GLUHFWO\ LQWR WKH &RXUW¶V PRVW UHFHQW GHFLVLRQ LQYROYLQJ
attenuation²Utah v. Strieff. In Strieff, the Court held that the discovery of an
outstanding arrest warrant for a defendant who was detained as part of an
unconstitutional Terry stop was an intervening factor that explained the
subsequent discovery of incriminating evidence on the person of the defendant
and severed the causal relationship between the illegal police conduct and the
discovery of the evidence.197 The defendant argued that the illegal Terry stop
XQGHUWDNHQE\WKHSROLFHRIILFHUZDVQRWRQO\D³EXW-IRU´FDXVHRIWKHVXEVHTXHQW
discovery of the incriminating evidence on his person, following his arrest, but
was also the actual or ultimate cause. The Court, however, asserted that this case
was similar to Segura v. United States insofar as the Segura FRXUW³VXJJHVWHGWKDW
the existence of a valid warrant favors finding that the connection between
XQODZIXO FRQGXFW DQG WKH GLVFRYHU\ RI HYLGHQFH LV µVXIILFLHQWO\ DWWHQXDWHG WR
GLVVLSDWH WKH WDLQW¶´198 This, however, is not what the Court held in Segura.
5DWKHUWKH&RXUWHQJDJHGLQD³EXW-IRU´FDXVDWLRQDUJXPHQWWR assert that the
independent source doctrine justified evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that
ZDVQRWWDLQWHGE\DSULRULOOHJDOSROLFHHQWU\LQWRWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VDSDUWPHQW199
Segura had nothing to do with the question of attenuation and intervening events.
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, next argues that the nature of the
intervening event was such that it simply had to sever the causal linkage between
the illegal stop and the subsequently discovered evidence. He contends that,
because the officeU KDG D ³MXGLFLDO PDQGDWH´ WR DUUHVW WKH GHIHQGDQW RQFH WKH
outstanding warrant was discovered, his subsequent act of arresting and
VHDUFKLQJWKHGHIHQGDQWZDVD³PLQLVWHULDODFWWKDWZDVLQGHSHQGHQWO\FRPSHOOHG
by the pre-H[LVWLQJZDUUDQW´200 Finally, ThomDVDUJXHVWKDWLWZDV³XQGLVSXWHGO\
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ODZIXO´IRUWKHRIILFHUWRVHDUFKWKHGHIHQGDQWDVDQLQFLGHQWRIWKHDUUHVW201 All
of this may be absolutely true²but it tells us nothing about causation. Just as it
LV LQGLVSXWDEO\ WUXH WKDW WKH RIILFHU¶V DFWLRQV ZHUH Pinisterial, judicially
mandated, and lawful within the immediate context of an arrest, they were also
part of a single series of events that all flowed from the illegal stop and would
never have occurred without the illegal stop. Thus, the causal link between the
illegal stop and the subsequent discovery of incriminating evidence was not
severed by the additional actions of the police officer²they merely augmented
the causal impact of the original illegal stop.202 A common sense approach to
causation would have no difficulty in concluding that the illegal stop caused the
discovery of the incriminating evidence.
3. Purpose and Flagrancy of Police Action
Finally, the Brown court held that it was important to consider the
purpose and flagrancy of the police conduct when deciding whether the
discovery of incriminating evidence was attenuated from the original illegal
police conduct.203 Apparently, flagrant conduct is more likely to perpetuate the
linkage between police conduct and the subsequent discovery of the
incriminating evidence. 7KH &RXUW QRWHV WKDW WKLV WKLUG IDFWRU LV ³SDUWLFXODUO\´
significant in assessing attenuation.204 Unfortunately, this third test poses the
most ambiguity and seems to be the least related to the concept of causality. It is
not obvious why the flagrancy of the police misconduct would lengthen or
shorten the causal links between the conduct and the ultimately discovered
evidence. The Court offers no explanation but does cite three lower federal court
decisions in support of this factor. These cases, United States v. Edmons,205
United States ex. rel. Gockley v. Myers,206 and United States v. Kilgen,207 all
loosely stood for the proposition that, once the police had engaged in illegal
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 96 Side A

201

Id. at 2063.
It is important to note that there is one situation in which knowledge of other criminal
activity involving the defendant can act as an intervening event that severs the causal relationship
between the illegal police conduct and the subsequent discovery of evidence. That is when the
defendant voluntarily engages in criminal acts as a response to the police activity, and this leads
the police to discover incriminating evidence. This ³new crime exception´ is viewed as either an
example of attenuation of the taint of the original illegal police conduct or as a stand-alone, policybased exception to the exclusionary rule. In any event, it seems clear that this exception only
applies if ³the defendant engaged in further criminal acts.´It does not apply to a situation in which
prior illegal conduct is discovered. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
180 (7th ed. 2013).
203
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604±05 (1975).
202

204

206
207

Id. at 604.
432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
450 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1971).
445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971).
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conduct, the consequence of that conduct depended upon whether they had
intended to do so in order to gain some sort of investigative advantage. Thus, in
these cases, the operative fact would not simply be police misconduct²it would
be police misconduct done for an illicit purpose.208 This focus on malign purpose
is further emphasized in Brown ZKHQWKH&RXUWREVHUYHGWKDWWKH³PDQQHULQ
ZKLFK %URZQ¶V DUUHVW ZDV HIIHFWHG JLYHV WKH DSSHDUDQFH RI KDYLQJ EHHQ
calculated to cause surprise, IULJKWDQGFRQIXVLRQ´209
Certainly, it can (and perhaps should) be argued that when the police
intentionally take advantage of their illegal conduct to gather further
incriminating evidence, they should not get the benefits of their illicit tactics.
Yet, attenuation is a causal concept and the flagrancy of the police conduct has
little to do with causality²at least as it seems to be defined by the Court in Brown
and subsequent cases. The concern that Brown appears to have with the flagrancy
of the police misconduct has to do with intentions, not causation.210 One can
envision a situation in which the police are clearly acting illegally by detaining a
suspect and they may clearly have intended that such detention would lead to
further incriminating evidence, but obtaining a confession is not causally
inevitable due to the police intent. Even when the conduct was calculated to
cause surprise, fright, and confusion, it could just as easily be the case that the
VXVSHFW¶V HYHQWXDO FRQIHVVLRQ ZDV WKH FRQVHTXHQFH RI an intervening
circumstance such as a long visit with an attorney or pastor, or it could have been
the result of a lengthy lapse of time during which the suspect reflected carefully
on the situation and chose to confess. On the other hand, one can similarly

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 96 Side B

208
This interpretation of what the Brown Court meant by ³flagrant conduct´ is supported by
the Court¶s decision in Dunaway v. New York just four years later. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). There, in
a recitation of the Brown factors as applied to the facts of the underlying case, the Court discussed
the flagrancy test by stating, ³Petitioner was also admittedly seized without probable cause in the
hopes that something might turn up . . . ´ Id. at 218. Clearly, the Court viewed the conduct as
potentially flagrant because of the intent of the officers.
209
Brown, 422 U.S. at 605. It is important to note that this aspect of Brown has taken on a life
of its own in subsequent cases. It hardly seems likely that the concerns regarding surprise, fright,
and confusion were the primary concerns associated with the concept of flagrant police conduct.
Yet, in Taylor v. Alabama, both the majority and the dissent commented on whether the original
illegal arrest was ³violent´ or involved surprise, fright, or confusion. 457 U.S. 687, 692, 699
(1982). In fact, the majority in Taylor noted that ³[t]he fact that the police did not physically abuse
petitioner . . . does not cure the illegality of the original arrest.´ Id. at 693. This focus on surprise,
fright, and confusion has found its way into lower court decisions as well. See United States v.
Wells, 690 F. App¶x 338 (6th Cir. 2017).
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210
Of particular concern would be that a focus on intentions necessarily renders the evaluation
of purpose and flagrancy a subjective process. This potentiality is noted by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Garcia, 974 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2020). There, the court observed,
³,t is not settled whether it is appropriate to examine an officer¶s subjective intentions in evaluating
the µpurpose and flagrancy¶ of a Fourth Amendment violation. The word µpurpose¶ suggests a
subjective inquiry. But only rarely are Fourth Amendment questions governed by subjective
standards, and the Supreme Court has made it clear in the context of the related µgood faith
exception¶ that the inquiry must remain objective.´ Id. at 1082 n.8.

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 97 Side A

 

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹʹ

2021] Ward: Restoring
RESTORING
TO Establishing
ATTENUATION
CausalityCAUSALITY
in Attenuation:
the Breadth of a

183

211
212
213
214

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 97 Side A

imagine a situation in which the officer acted with all of the best intentions to
protect the rights of the suspect but erred in his understanding of the law. The
confession that follows such police misconduct by a matter of minutes without
any intervening event is no less causally related to the original misconduct just
EHFDXVHWKHRIILFHUPDGHDQ³KRQHVWPLVWDNH´
$QG \HW WKLV ³KRQHVW PLVWDNH´ DSSURDFK VHHPV WR KDYH JDLQHG VRPH
favor in the Supreme Court. In Strieff, the Court states that the officer involved
ZDV ³DW PRVW QHJOLJHQW´ DQG KDG PDGH ³WZR JRRG-IDLWK PLVWDNHV´211 Justice
Clarence Thomas goes on to articulate a view of the facts and the Brown purpose
and flagrancy test that looks astoundingly like an elaborate argument for a
JHQHUDO³JRRGIDLWK´H[FHSWLRQ +HFKDUDFWHUL]HVWKHRIILFHU¶VFRQGXFWDVDQHUURU
in judgment212 DQGD³PLVWDNHQ´GHFLVLRQ213 He further suggests that the failure
WR GHPRQVWUDWH D ³V\VWHPLF RU UHFXUUHQW´ SUDFWLFH E\ WKH RIILFHU VRPHKRZ
diminishes the original illegality of his conduct.214 To wrap up his argument,
-XVWLFH 7KRPDV FKDUDFWHUL]HG WKLV LOOHJDO VWRS DV ³DQ LVRODWHG LQVWDQFH RI
QHJOLJHQFH´215 All of this may be true²but it is utterly irrelevant to the causal
question at hand. If the original stop was illegal²and the Court assumes this to
be true216²then the well-intentioned nature of the constitutional violation
certainly has no impact on the causal relationship between that violation and the
subsequent discovery of incriminating evidence. If the intentions of the officer
did matter so much, then what the Court should really be advocating for is
DQRWKHU³JRRG-IDLWK´H[FHSWLRQDQGQRWDIDLWKIXODSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHDWWHQXDWLRQ
rules.
Aside from the fact that flagrancy of police conduct, as defined in
Brown, seems directed against intentional police misconduct, which is a noncausal factor, other ambiguities with respect to flagrancy exist. For example,
when do we measure the presence oUDEVHQFHRI³IODJUDQW´PLVFRQGXFW" Are we
only concerned with it at the time of the original event, or can it be important if
flagrant misconduct continues? Assume that the original arrest is a violation of
WKH VXVSHFW¶V )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW ULJKWV EXW WKH Solice had simply made a
mistake. If they then engage in provocative post-arrest conduct that is
³IODJUDQWO\´ LQDSSURSULDWH LH DEXVLYH ODQJXDJH GHPHDQLQJ WUHDWPHQW HWF 
does that support causally linking the original misconduct to a subsequent
confession? Does it have any relevance at all to the question of causality? If
flagrancy is related only to the original incident of police misconduct, does the
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Interestingly, the Court concedes this point in a very round-about way. It states, ³we assume
without deciding (because the State conceded the point) that Officer Frackell lacked reasonable
suspicion to initially stop Strieff.´ Id. at 2062.
216
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fact that the Fourth Amendment violation is glaringly obvious make it flagrant?
If not, might a betteUWHVWEH³LQWHQWLRQDOLW\´UDWKHUWKDQIODJUDQF\" While that
may be what is meant by flagrancy, it is very unlikely that the Supreme Court
would ever embrace a subjective test focusing on intent.
The one thing that we are quite sure about is the popularity of this third
test in post-Brown jurisprudence. Most courts dutifully make reference to the
Brown &RXUW¶VFRPPHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHSDUWLFXODULPSRUWDQFHRIIODJUDQF\DQG
QHDUO\ DOO VXJJHVW WKDW RIILFHU IODJUDQF\ LV ³WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW SDUW RI WKH
DQDO\VLV´ZLWKRXWDUWLFXODWLQJZK\²from a causal perspective²that should be
so.217 This is particularly disappointing insofar as this particular Brown test is the
least likely to provide insights into the causal relationship between the original
police misconduct and the subsequent incriminating evidence.218 As we shall see,
however, this portion of Brown becomes quite important when pursuing other
objectives in an attenuation analysis that ignores causality.219
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Brown approach to
attenuation and many of the cases that follow it may be factually grounded on a
situation in which the subsequent incriminating evidence is a direct consequence
of the volitional conduct of the defendant.220 Thus, after police misconduct, the
suspect either confesses or consents to a search, and then the incriminating
evidence is uncovered. It may be argued that the kind of causal analysis engaged
in by the Court in Wong Sun and Brown is premised on volitional conduct by the
suspect which occurs as a consequence of the circumstances commenced by
police misconduct.221
A causally based attenuation analysis becomes much more difficult if
the subsequently discovered evidence is not the result of conduct on the part of
the defendant. We can readily understand how the actions of the police would
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 97 Side B

217

E.g., United States v. Smith, 919 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2019); see also Frimmel Mgmt., LLC
v. United States, 897 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Terry, 909 F.3d 716, 722
(4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Mendez, 885 F.3d 899, 909 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Yorgensen, 845 F.3d 908, 915 (8th Cir. 2017); McDaniel v. Polley, 847 F.3d 887, 896 (7th Cir.
2017); United States v. Lebeau, 867 F.3d 960, 973 (8th Cir. 2017).
218
It is worthwhile to question the ramifications of the alleged import of purpose and flagrancy.
Could it be the case that when a police officer acts with good faith and no obvious nefarious
purpose that this would override²for purposes of attenuation analysis²the impact of temporal
proximity and the lack of an intervening circumstance? Surely if that were so, attenuation would
have simply morphed into another ³good faith exception´ to the exclusionary rule. Yet, it is not
obvious why that could not happen given the status afforded to the purpose and flagrancy of the
police misconduct.
219
220

See infra Part IV.
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).

This distinction forms a primary part of the Utah Supreme Court¶s decision in State v. Strieff,
357 P.3d 532 (Utah 2015). There, the court held that attenuation should be limited to instances
involving independent acts of defendants, which can be characterized as ³independent acts of free
will.´ Id. at 544.
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LQIOXHQFH D GHIHQGDQW¶V EHKDYLRU DQG KRZ ODSVH RI WLPH ZRXOG GLPinish that
influence. But what happens if the subsequently discovered evidence was
discovered without the participation of the defendant in any meaningful way?
)RUH[DPSOHLIWKHSROLFHLOOHJDOO\VHL]HGDVXVSHFW¶VYHKLFOHDQGWRZHGLWWRDQ
impound lot, would it really matter if the police officer looked into the vehicle
and observed illegal contraband 20 minutes later or three days later? Does the
lapse of time make any difference in our conclusion that the illegal seizure led to
the discovery of the evidence?
Similarly, an intervening event may, from the perspective of causality,
sever the causal linkage between illegal police conduct and the subsequent
GLVFRYHU\ RI LQFULPLQDWLQJ HYLGHQFH WKDW ZDV SURYLGHG E\ WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V
independent act of free will. In such a circumstance, the intervening event
assumes the role of cause and this is understandable. However, if there is no
participation by the defendant in the subsequent discovery of the incriminating
evidence, it is extremely difficult to understand how intervening factors fit into
the analysis. If we take the example above where the police illegally seize a
vehicle and then look into the vehicle to observe illegal contraband, what type of
intervening circumstance could possibly sever the causal link between the illegal
police conduct and the subsequent discovery of the incriminating evidence? Any
intervening circumstance offered could only be one based on policy concerns.
Causality simply would not recognize a situation in which the intervening
circumstance clearly severs the causal linkage that clearly exists. Rather,
attenuation without volitional conduct by a defendant looks much more like the
tort notion of proximate cause. As such, it is far more influenced by policy
concerns about when causal links ought to be severed. Because it is simply too
difficult to assess the causal consequences of an intervening event when the
ultimate discovery of evidence is not tied to the volitional conduct of a suspect,
common sense would suggest that some other mechanism is necessary to
evaluate how responsible the illegal police activity is for the ultimate discovery
of evidence. Causality does not work, and we should not be claiming that it does.
NON-CAUSAL USES OF ATTENUATION

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

C M
Y K

39

11/16/2021 08:40:42

The Supreme Court has utilized attenuation as a reason to not extend the
taint of a Fourth Amendment violation to the later discovery of incriminating
evidence in a number of situations that are not clearly associated with causality.
These references to attenuation are really attempts to hijack an existing causal
doctrine for purposes that attenuation was never intended to serve. In order to
maintain logical consistency in the causal notion of attenuation, these ancillary
uses of the concept should be reconfigured to more appropriately reflect their
origins and purposes. This section will discuss three main non-causal uses and
applications of attenuation: firstly, the interests being served approach, secondly,
foreseeability, and lastly, deterrence.

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 98 Side B

 

186

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹʹ

WEST
LAW
REVIEW
West Virginia
LawVIRGINIA
Review, Vol.
124,
Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 7

[Vol. 124

A. The Interests Being Served Approach

222
223
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In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court articulated what may be the
best framing of a non-causal use of attenuation.222 There, the Court stated,
³>D@WWHQXDWLRQ DOVR RFFXUV ZKHQ HYHQ JLYHQ D GLUHFW FDXVDO FRQQHFWLRQ WKH
interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would
not be served E\VXSSUHVVLRQRIWKHHYLGHQFHREWDLQHG´223 The Court utilized this
claim to argue that a clear violation of the knock and announce rule which had a
direct causal connection to the discovery of incriminating evidence was
³DWWHQXDWHG´ EHFDXVH WKH SXUSRVH RI WKH NQRFN DQG DQQRXQFH UXOH ZDV QRW WR
protect suspects from unlawful warrantless searches.224 This argument sounds
very much like the limitations placed on finding negligence liability in the
context of negligence per se.225 When a statute is being relied upon to establish
DEUHDFKRIWKHGXW\FRXUWVKDYHUHTXLUHGWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VDFWLRQVEHRIWKH
type that the statute was designed to prevent and the injuries suffered be of the
type that the statute was intended to prevent.226
This limitation on liability is logical and serves a useful purpose, but it
certainly is not a mechanism to address causation. In the context of Fourth
Amendment cases, it is reasonable to conclude that evidence should not be
excluded when the violation that led to the discovery of the evidence was of a
right that was not designed to protect suspects from illegal searches. Thus, in the
context of knock and announce, the reasons for the rule are not to prevent the
police from uncovering evidence in an unconstitutional manner. Thus, from this
³SROLF\SHUVSHFWLYH´WKHUHPHG\IRUVXFKDYLRODWLRQVKRXOGQRWEHRQHGHVLJQHG
for an altogether different constitutional violation. All of this makes sense²even
if we disagree with the underlying presumptions which support the conclusion.
However, this is not attenuation as a causal concept. Causation has nothing to do
with this analysis.227 In Hudson, the Court even acknowledged that a direct causal
connection existed between the actions of the police and the ultimate discovery
of the evidence. This non-causal approach to attenuation was reemphasized by
the Court in Utah v. Strieff, where Justice Thomas noted that ³>H@YLGHQFH LV
admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the
evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance,
VXFK WKDW µWKH LQWHUHVW SURWHFWHG E\ WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO JXDUDQWHH WKDW KDV EHHQ

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006).
Id.

224
Id. The Court has reached similar conclusions in United States v. Cecollini, 435 U.S. 268,
279 (1978) and New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990).
225

KEETON ET AL., supra note 144, § 36.
Id.

227

Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and its
Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1741, 1761 n.77 (2008).
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YLRODWHG ZRXOG QRW EH VHUYHG E\ VXSSUHVVLRQ RI WKH HYLGHQFH REWDLQHG¶´228
Logical FRQVLVWHQF\ DQG DFFXUDF\ UHTXLUH WKDW WKLV ³H[FOXVLRQ´ EH FDOOHG
something (anything) else²but not attenuation.
B. Attenuation and Foreseeability
Foreseeability is a prominent feature of tort law and proximate cause. In
fact, law students often (incorrectly) distill the entire concept of proximate cause
down to the simple question of whether the injury suffered was or was not
foreseeable.229 The sources of foreseeability as proximate cause can be traced to
the infamous Palsgraf case in which Judge William S. Andrews mentions this
factor prominently in his attempt to craft a test for the presence of proximate
cause.230 Foreseeability has, regrettably, bled into our discussion of attenuation²
with the consequence of undermining the clear causal purpose of attenuation
analysis.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer first injects the concept of foreseeability into
an attenuation argument in Hudson v. Michigan.231 There, in his dissent, he notes
that it should be of some significance that the discovery of evidence in the
GHIHQGDQW¶V KRPH DIWHU WKH IDLOXUH WR NQRFN DQG DQQRXQFH ³ZDV D UHDGLO\
foreseeable consequence of their entry and their unlawful presence within the
KRPH´232 )RUHVHHDELOLW\ZDVLPSRUWDQWLQ-XVWLFH%UH\HU¶VPLQGLQHVWDEOLVKLQJ
a link between the illegal officer conduct and the subsequent discovery of
incriminating evidence.
A better example of foreseeability assuming a role in attenuation causal
analysis is Justice Elena .DJDQ¶V GLVVHQW LQ Utah v. Strieff.233 There, Justice
Kagan starts with the Brown tests for attenuation but quickly injects
foreseeability as a modifier to the intervening circumstances test.234 Attenuation,
in her opinion, is to be viewed as similar to tort law which allows an intervening

229
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228

136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016).
Having taught Torts for five years in the past, the author has reached this conclusion first-

hand.
230

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928).

231

233
234

136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
Id. at 2072±73.
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547 U.S. 586, 615 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Breyer cites the Second Restatement of Torts § 435 to support his assertion.
Within the comments, it is noted that ³if the actor should have realized that his conduct might cause
harm to another in substantially the manner in which it is brought about, the harm is universally
regarded as the legal consequence of the actor¶s negligence.´ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
435 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1965). The two crucial words in this comment are first that the conduct
³might´ cause the harm and that the harm is regarded as the ³legal´ consequence of the actor¶s
negligence. Clearly, this statement does not support the notion that a common-sense assessment of
causality would support a direct causal link between what the actor did and what happened simply
because the outcome could have been (or even was) foreseen.
232
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235
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237
238
239

Id. at 2073.
553 U.S. 639 (2008).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 144, § 42.
HART & HONORÉ, supra note 140, at 230±31.
Id. at 231±32.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 144, § 43 at 297.

241

William H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability: A Murky Crystal Ball for Predicting Liability, 23
CUMB. L. REV. 349, 387 (1992).
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FLUFXPVWDQFHWRVHYHUWKHFDXVDOOLQN³RQO\ZKHQLWLs unforeseeable²not when
LWFDQEHVHHQFRPLQJIURPPLOHVDZD\´235 Justice Kagan relies on Bridge v.
Phoenix Bond and Indemnity Company,236 yet Bridge is a case involving civil
fraud in which proximate cause is an appropriate measuring stick for liability,
particularly when proximate cause is used as a tool to limit liability in the civil
context.237 This is certainly an appealing approach. To take law from another area
that has been well developed over time and apply it to a similar situation in
another area of the law is what lawyers (and judges) are trained to do.
However, this approach can be dangerous when the underlying rationale
for the approach taken in one area of the law does not necessarily justify its use
in another. 3UR[LPDWHFDXVHDVGLVFXVVHGHDUOLHUKDVDOZD\VEHHQD³VKRUWFXW´
to aid in establishing liability. As such, it has never been viewed as a purely
causal tool. Rather, as we discussed earlier, proximate cause is a device to limit
liability when we realize that a pure causal approach may extend liability beyond
what policy considerations would approve. Foreseeability nicely assists in this
process. Causal links are only severed when the intervening circumstance is
unforeseeable²yet foreseeability has nothing to do with causality.
Hart and Honoré have made this argument, pointing to the fact that
IRUHVHHDELOLW\LVUHDOO\D³SROLF\´EDVHGWHVWUDWKHUWKDQRQHEDVHGRQFDXVDOLW\238
As such, a foreseeability approach to assessing responsibility can be broader in
assigning responsibility than that established by causality and can also be much
narrower in assigning responsibility than can causality.239 Foreseeability can be
a limiting factor when it limits responsibility but can also create an expanded
notion of responsibility beyond what we would expect with ordinary causality.
One might be justified in questioning the relevance of a factor that has such
unpredictable consequences. As W. Page KHHWRQKDVREVHUYHG³WKHFRQFHSWRI
foreseeability so completely lacks all clarity and precision that it amounts to little
more than a convenient formula for disposing of the case . . . .´240 The reality
here is simple. $V:LOOLDP++DUGLH-UQRWHG³IRUHseeability serves no purpose
LQWKHFDXVDOLW\LQTXLU\´241 The ability to foresee a particular outcome tells you
nothing about what actually caused the outcome. All it does is allow one to sort
RXWWKHFDVHVRIDQWLFLSDWHGRU³HDV\´FDXVDOLW\IURPWKHKDUGHU cases in which
the causal link is not one that a casual observer would anticipate. It tells us
nothing about the validity of the claimed causal link between the precipitating
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event and the ultimate outcome.242 As such, it has no utility in attenuation
analysis that is predicated on causality.
C. Deterrence
The most significant use of attenuation to serve a non-causal purpose is
when attenuation is used to support the conclusion that the exclusionary rule
would not deter the police misconduct in question—and thus, exclusion is
pointless. The linkage between deterrence as a policy objective of the
exclusionary rule and attenuation as a causal test designed to define the limits of
the taint resulting from a Fourth Amendment violation are not obvious. In fact,
after a careful examination, it can be shown that there is no logical connection
between the two. In order, however, to fully explore this questionable approach,
it is necessary to briefly examine the evolution of the exclusionary rule and the
triumph of those who advocate for deterrence as the sole measure of its use.
The exclusionary rule has its origins in federal cases involving police
misconduct that led to the discovery of incriminating evidence. In Weeks v.
United States,243 the police entered the defendDQW¶VKRPHDQGVHDUFKHGLWRQWZR
separate occasions without a search warrant.244 The Court was forced to establish
a remedy for such a situation and declined to allow the government to utilize the
evidence seized from the searches. Rather, the Court observed,
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and Seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution.245
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 100 Side A
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Id. at 393.
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242
One way to illustrate this point is to consider the following fact patterns. Assume a scientist
has discovered two previously unknown, but apparently innocuous, substances. The scientist
combines the two substances and an explosion occurs. After the fact, a scientific study establishes
that the explosion was an inevitable consequence given the properties of the substances. Was it
foreseeable that the combination of the two substances would lead to an explosion? No. Was the
combination of the two substances the cause of the explosion? Yes. Foreseeability told us nothing
about causation. Another example. Defendant is responsible for carrying a rare Chinese vase from
an antiques dealer to the home of the purchaser of the vase. Defendant is intoxicated and has strayed
into the road several times on his way to the purchaser¶s home. The last time that he strayed into
the road, Driver who is speeding and driving recklessly does not attempt to avoid Defendant, strikes
him with the car, and the vase is destroyed. Was it foreseeable that, by attempting to transport the
vase while intoxicated, Defendant created a necessary condition for the injury suffered to the vase?
Yes. Was Defendant the cause of the injury to the vase? Based on any common-sense principles
of causation the answer would be no. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 140, at 231±32.
243
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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The Court precluded the use of these documents seized without a warrant
LQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VWULDO This position was reinforced E\WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ
Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. et. al. v. United States246 where the Court stated
WKDW ³>W@KH HVVHQFH RI D SURYLVLRQ IRUELGGLQJ WKH DFTXLVLWLRQ RI HYLGHQFH LQ D
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
&RXUWEXWWKDWLWVKDOOQRWEHXVHGDWDOO´247
This fairly straightforward approach to illegally seized evidence became
complicated when the Supreme Court addressed the same situation in the context
of a state court prosecution. In Wolf v. Colorado,248 the Supreme Court
recognized that the Fourth Amendment prohibition on illegal searches and
seizures applied to the states insofar as it was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and contrary to our concepts of ordered liberty.249 However, the
Court struggled to discover an appropriate remedy for this Constitutional
violation. Justice Felix Frankfurter started out asserting that no single approach
was necessary²DFRQFOXVLRQFHUWDLQO\FRQWUDU\WRWKH&RXUW¶VSRVLWLRQLQWeeks
and Silverthorne.250 Rather, Justice Frankfurter asserted that the remedies in
Weeks and Silverthorne were QHLWKHU³derived from the explicit requirements of
the Fourth amendment´ QRU ZHUH WKH\ ³EDVHG RQ OHJLVODWLRQ H[SUHVVLQJ
Congressional policy in the enforcement of the ConsWLWXWLRQ´251
As such, the remedy is not mandated by the Constitution and can take
many forms. Frankfurter asserted that the states could best determine the remedy
that should be provided²including such questionable remedies as civil actions
for damages.252 Justice Frankfurter also opened the door for the now dominant
deterrence argument. +HDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWH[FOXGLQJWKHHYLGHQFHPD\³EHDQ
HIIHFWLYHZD\RIGHWHUULQJXQUHDVRQDEOHVHDUFKHV´EXWJRHVRQWRDVVHUWWKDWWKH
states can find other remedies that are less demanding than exclusion.253

247
248
249
250
251
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251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Id. at 392.
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Id. at 27±8.
Id. at 28.
Id.
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Id. at 30.
Id. at 31. Justice Wiley B. Rutledge and Justice William F. Murphy dissented from Justice
Frankfurter¶s opinion noting, in part, that ³the Amendment without the sanction is a dead letter.´
Id. at 47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). There is much academic discussion on the overwhelming
influence of Justice Frankfurter on the development of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See
MACLIN, supra note 13, at 37±46. Frequently, that discussion portrays Justice Frankfurter¶s
influence as being hostile to the fundamental notions of exclusion. Id. at 40. In fact, it is interesting
to observe that Justice Frankfurter never even specifically acknowledges that the conduct of the
Colorado officers was unconstitutional. Id. No mention of the facts is made at all in Frankfurter¶s
opinion, and he seems far more interested in raising questions about the legitimacy of the
253
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The Supreme Court moved on from Wolf in 1961 with its decision in
Mapp v. Ohio.254 Here the Court forthrightly confronted a clear Fourth
Amendment violation and sought the appropriate remedy in a state court
prosecution. Justice Tom C. Clark, who drafted the majority opinion, quickly
GLVWDQFHG KLPVHOI IURP )UDQNIXUWHU¶V DSSURDFK E\ REVHUYLQJ WKDW WKH UXOH
established in Weeks was of constitutional origin.255 As the majority opinion
FOHDUO\VWDWHV³DOOHYLGHQFHREWDLQHGE\VHDUches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority LQDGPLVVLEOH LQ D VWDWH FRXUW´256
Regrettably, Justice Clark did not stop there. Rather, he went on to offer other²
non-constitutional²reasons for the exclusionary rule. He observed that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter257 and then, later, that judicial
integrity mandated an exclusionary rule.258 7KHVH GLIIHUHQW ³SXUSRVHV´
undoubtedly raised confusion about the nature of the remedy. Was exclusion
mandated by the Constitution, or was it simply a judicially created remedy based
on practical considerations of deterrence or judicial integrity? If the latter, the
application of the rule would depend upon whether it furthered the stated purpose
of the rule. If constitutionally mandated, however, there would be no case-bycase assessment of the application of the rule²it would always apply as long as
that constitutional mandate existed.
7KH SRWHQWLDO FRQIXVLRQ LQ -XVWLFH &ODUN¶V RSLQLRQ ZDV VRRQ
exacerbated²by Justice Clark. In Linkletter v. Walker,259 Clark wrote a majority
opinion addressing the retroactive application of the ruling in Mapp. In the course
of the opinion, Clark made clear that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was
deterrence²and apparently only deterrence.260 $V7UDF\0DFOLQQRWHV³>D@IWHU
Linkletter, the [exclusionary] rule would forever be viewed by a majority of the
Court as a deterrent-based remedy, and not mandated by the Constitution
LWVHOI´261 This conclusion, in and of itself, says little about the relationship
between the exclusionary rule and attenuation. Whether the Court was correct in
this conclusion is beyond the scope of our discussion. What we do know is that
this conclusion, of a policy nature, has become the prevalent way of evaluating
the applicability of the exclusionary rule ever since. Starting in 1968 with Justice

exclusionary rule and suggesting that the only purpose for the rule is deterrence. He, in effect,
separates the Fourth Amendment violation from the discussion and focuses only on the remedy.
Id. at 37±46.
254
255
256
257
258

260
261

Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
Id. at 656.
Id. at 659.
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Id. at 633±37.
MACLIN, supra note 15, at 111.
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367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 649.
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Byron R. :KLWH¶VGLVVHQWLQHarrison v. United States,262 the Supreme Court has
become increasingly clear that the only purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter police misconduct. Justice William J. Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
pushed back against this claim in United States v. Janis QRWLQJWKDW³,DGKHUHWR
my view that the exclusionary rule is a necessary and inherent constitutional
ingredient of the SURWHFWLRQV RI WKH )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW´263 Surprisingly, 14
years later, Justice Thurgood Marshall grudgingly acknowledged the dominance
RIGHWHUUHQFHYLHZQRWLQJ³>L@QUHFHQW\HDUVWKLV&RXUWKDVUHSHDWHGO\VWDWHGWKDW
the principal purpose of the Fourth AmHQGPHQW¶V H[FOXVLRQDU\ UXOH LV WR
HOLPLQDWHLQFHQWLYHVIRUSROLFHRIILFHUVWRYLRODWHWKDW$PHQGPHQW´264
Sixteen years later, Justice Breyer²often considered to be part of the
liberal wing of the Supreme Court²stated in Hudson v. Michigan WKDW ³WKH
driving legal purpose underlying the exclusionary rule [is] the deterrence of
XQODZIXO JRYHUQPHQW EHKDYLRU´265 In the most recent Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule case heard by the Supreme Court, Utah v. Strieff, the triumph
of deterrence theory was complete with the majority opinion and a dissenting
opinion by Justice Kagan both formulaically reciting the proposition that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence as the blackletter law upon which
all else follows.266
This policy choice is immaterial to an understanding of a causal
approach to attenuation. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Hudson,
³DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH H[FOXVLRQDU\ UXOH LV D VHSDUDWH TXHVWLRQ IURP ZKHWKHU WKH
)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWKDVEHHQYLRODWHG´267 And this is the point. Attenuation is a
mechanism to assess the causal linkage between illegal police conduct and
subsequent discovery of incriminating evidence. The conclusion that such a
linkage exists means, at root, that the ultimate discovery of incriminating
evidence is a Fourth Amendment violation²just as in a situation in which the
evidence discovered directly flowed from the violation in question. This is all
that attenuation is designed to do. It is not meant to assist in evaluating an
appropriate remedy for the situation. It is only intended to establish the presence
or absence of a Fourth Amendment violation.
Just as attenuation is not intended to address the question of remedy, it
is, thus, not intended to address the issue of deterrence. The separation of these
two issues is implicitly recognized by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion in

262

392 U.S. 219, 228 (1968) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White¶s dissent in Harrison is
fascinating insofar as his strong deterrent position is based²apparently exclusively²on a 1967
comment contained in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Comment, Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree—A Plea for Restraint Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136 (1967).
263
428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976).
264

266
267

New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 22 (1990).
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 608 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2057, 2071 (2016).
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 611 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Hudson v. Michigan.268 Nevertheless, over time, some members of the Court
have attempted to tie the concept of attenuation to the remedial considerations
associated with deterrence. This linkage makes no sense in terms of what
attenuation is intended to do, nor do our measures of attenuation add anything to
an assessment of the propriety of deterrence as justification for the remedy of
exclusion.269
The first attempt to tie these two concepts together can be found in the
concurrence in part opinion in Brown drafted by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. and
joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. They argued that attenuation
VKRXOGEHYLHZHGDVWKHPHDQVE\ZKLFKZHFDQ³PDUNWKHSRLQWDW which the
detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the
GHWHUUHQWHIIHFWRIWKHH[FOXVLRQDU\UXOHQRORQJHUMXVWLILHVLWVFRVW´270 Powell
JRHVRQWRDUJXHWKDW³WKHWong Sun inquiry always should be conducted with
the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule sharply in
IRFXV´271 7KXV IURP -XVWLFH 3RZHOO¶V SHUVSHFWLYH WKH SXUSRVH RI DWWHQXDWLRQ
analysis is not to establish the causal relationship between the police misconduct
and the subsequently discovered evidence, but rather to draw a line beyond which
exclusion will not occur²irrespective of causation²due to the deterrent
consequences.272 As such, attenuation is used to assess the admissibility of the
evidence, not its causal relationship to a prior Fourth Amendment violation.
In Dunaway v. New York, the Court in an opinion drafted by Justice
Brennan offers a different view of the relationship between deterrence and
attenuation. He stated:

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 102 Side A

Brown’s IRFXVRQWKHµFDXVDOFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHen the illegality
DQGWKHFRQIHVVLRQ¶UHIOHFWHGWKHWZRSROLFLHVEHKLQGWKHXVHRI
the exclusionary rule to effectuate the Fourth Amendment.
When there is a close causal connection between the illegal
seizure and the confession, not only is exclusion of the evidence
more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, but

271
272

Id. at 612.
Id. at 612±13.
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268
There, Justice Antonin G. Scalia notes, ³4uite apart from the requirement of unattenuated
causation, the exclusionary rule has never been applied except µwhere its deterrence benefits
outweigh its ³substantial social costs.¶´´ Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
269
Fairness requires recognition of the fact that Justice Marshall²an ostensible opponent to
the ³deterrence only´ theory of the exclusionary rule²acknowledges the linkage between
deterrence and attenuation by observing that ³our attenuation analysis must be driven by an
understanding of how extensive exclusion must be to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment.´
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 22 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Despite this, however,
Marshall goes on to explain attenuation as an attempt to discern if ³a suspect¶s statement is properly
attributable to a Fourth Amendment violation or to the suspect¶s independent act of will. . . ´Id.
at 23. Clearly, this is a causal question, not a policy-based question.
270
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
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also use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the
integrity of the courts.273

273
274
275
276
277
278
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The Supreme Court reemphasized this ostensible linkage between causal
analysis and deterrence in Barry v. New Jersey.274 On one level, it can be argued
that Justice White is acknowledging that there is a two-step process: first,
establish a causal link, and second, make a policy based decision on whether the
exclusionary rule should be applied.275 However, the argument that deterrence is
more effective when a close causal relationship has been established suggests
that there is some logical linkage between causality and deterrence. Such a
logical linkage certainly was noWHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQDunaway.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Strieff made the strongest argument
that one aspect of the Brown attenuation test was primarily focused on
deterrence. Focusing on the third part of the Brown test²that which examines
the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct²Justice Thomas, writing for
WKHPDMRULW\FODLPHGWKDWWKLV³WKLUGIDFWRURIWKHDWWHQXDWLRQGRFWULQHUHIOHFWV
[the purpose of the exclusionary rule to deter] by favoring exclusion only when
the police misconduct is most in need of deterrence²that is, when it is
SXUSRVHIXORUIODJUDQW´276
The risk of joining deterrence and attenuation is the consequent tendency
to skew the manner in which the presence or absence of attenuation is assessed.
This, coupled with the lack of a clear causal purpose for the third Brown test (the
purpose and flagrancy of the police conduct), can create a perfect storm of policy
dominating causation. 7KLV LV SHUKDSV EHVW LOOXVWUDWHG E\ -XVWLFH 5HKQTXLVW¶V
dissent in Dunaway v. New York.277 Rehnquist correctly identifies the various
Brown WHVWVDQGGHILQHVWKHTXHVWLRQDVZKHWKHUWKH³LQFXOSDWRU\VWDWHPHQWVZHUH
sufficiently a product of free will to be admissible under the Fourth
$PHQGPHQW´278 While the accuracy of this statement is debatable,279 Rehnquist
goes on to assert a more troubling argument. He suggests that, because deterrence
is the only purpose for the exclusionary rule, the third Brown test is the most
important. $VVXFK³>Z@KHUHSROLFHKDYHDFWHGLQJRRGIDLWKDQGQot in a flagrant
manner, I would require no more than that proper Miranda warnings be given

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217±18 (1979).
Barry v. New Jersey, 454 U.S. 1017, 1019 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
See generally id. at 2017.
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
Dunaway, 422 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 226.

279
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See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 23 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). There, Justice
Marshall in dissent notes, ³$ttenuation analysis assumes that the statement is µvoluntary¶ and asks
whether the connection between the illegal police conduct and the statement nevertheless requires
suppression to deter Fourth Amendment violations.´Id.
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and that the statement be voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.´280
This expansion of the ³good faith´ approach effectively eliminates
attenuation²as a causal concept²from the calculation. No longer are we
concerned with if A¶s actions caused B. Now we only ask if A was well
intentioned. Once again, we can imagine a situation in which the first two tests
in Brown suggest that attenuation does not exist, and thus a Fourth Amendment
violation has taken place. Yet, the third factor in Brown so obviously favors
attenuation that it overrides the finding of taint extending from a prior Fourth
Amendment violation, and the evidence is thus admissible. This later conclusion
is exclusively based on deterrence and the Court¶s attitudes regarding ³good
faith´ exceptions²in other words, policy and not causality. Even when causality
exists, it can be negated by policy.
Similarly, Justice Thomas in Utah v. Strieff asserts that the attenuation
doctrine stands for the proposition that ³[e]vidence is admissible when the
connection between unconstitutional police conduct is remote or has been
interrupted by some intervening circumstance.´281 The problem here is that
attenuation has nothing directly to do with admissibility. Attenuation is relevant
in determining if the ultimately discovered evidence is the consequence of a
Fourth Amendment violation. Other factors²many of them policy based²
determine the admissibility of the evidence. It is true that without causation and,
thus, a Fourth Amendment violation, there is no issue regarding admissibility.
That, however, is not the point of Justice Thomas¶s comment and is not how the
Court seems to view attenuation today. As Thomas concluded his majority
opinion in Strieff, ³we hold that the evidence discovered on Strieff¶s person was
admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the
preexisting arrest warrant.´282 Again, concluding that attenuation exists does not,
in and of itself, render the evidence admissible. Rather, the Court¶s policy
conclusion that deterrence is not served by excluding the evidence in such a
situation is the basis for its admissibility. This distinction is vital. Causality (and
logic) do not change over time. Policy based reasons for judicial action do. By
infusing attenuation with policy, the Court now subjects the concept to the winds
of change that constantly batter the Court. Causality should not be subject to such
uncertainty.
RESTORING CAUSATION TO ATTENUATION

It is time to return attenuation to its origins²as an approach to
establishing causality in those complicated situations in which evidence is
indirectly discovered after a clear Fourth Amendment violation. By limiting the
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 226.

281

Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061.
Id. at 2063.

282
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application of the attenuation doctrine to a more narrowly defined type of case,
redefining some aspects of the Brown approach and, finally, eliminating one of
the Brown tests altogether, it is possible to craft a purely causal evaluation of
those complicated situations of indirectly discovered incriminating evidence.
A. Limiting Attenuation to Those Occasions When We Evaluate an
Independent Act of Free Will

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 103 Side B

One of the simplest ways to avoid some problems posed by the Supreme
Court¶s attenuation jurisprudence is to simply limit its applicability. Courts
should only utilize the attenuation doctrine to analyze situations in which the
subsequently discovered incriminating evidence is the consequence of a
volitional act by the defendant.283 In other words, it should only be applicable to
those situations in which the defendant either subsequently confesses after a
Fourth Amendment violation or consents in some way to a physical search. This
would confine attenuation to those occasions in which we evaluate the
defendant¶s independent act of free will. This approach to attenuation was
perhaps best articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Strieff.284 There,
the Court observed that ³[t]he origins of attenuation are in cases involving
independent acts of criminal defendants. . .[a]nd the logic and terms of the
attenuation doctrine. . . are focused on separating the initial police illegality from
the subsequent, independent acts of a defendant.´285
If we look at the history of attenuation in the United States Supreme
Court, we first note that the seminal cases involving the concept²Wong Sun and
Brown²are both cases that deal with the subsequent volitional conduct of the
defendant that led to incriminating evidence. Hence, at its origins, attenuation
was a limited concept of causality. Similarly, those cases that seem to stretch
attenuation beyond its natural limits²cases such as Hudson and Strieff²involve
the discovery of evidence after a Fourth Amendment violation without any
volitional acts by the defendant leading to the discovery. The concept described
in Wong Sun and the tests articulated in Brown were designed to assist in
assessing causal links between police conduct and subsequent volitional conduct
by the defendant, not links between illegal police conduct and then additional
police conduct²such as in Hudson and Strieff. This limitation will significantly
contribute to a purer notion of attenuation as a causal concept.

284
285

357 P.3d 532 (Utah 2015).
Id. at 544.
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283
See George M. Derry III, “Allowing Lawless Police Conduct” in Order to Forbid “Lawless
Civilian Conduct”: The Court Further Erodes the Exclusionary Rule in Utah v. Strieff, 44
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 393, 422±23 (2017).
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B. Limiting the Definition of Intervening Events

286
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Next, courts should reconceive the concept of intervening events to
exclude those events that are undertaken by the police themselves. This revision
is best understood in light of the Supreme Court¶s arguments in Strieff. In Strieff,
the majority argued that the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant for the
defendant was an intervening event which severed the causal chain connecting
the original Fourth Amendment violation to the subsequent discovery of
incriminating evidence once Strieff was arrested.286 This fails to recognize two
realities. First, the police conduct in uncovering the arrest warrant was part of a
continuous cycle of events commencing with the illegal Terry stop with no
serious lapse of time. As Justice Thomas admits, the discovery of the evidence
took place ³only minutes after the illegal stop.´287 There was no intervening
event, just one long course of police action.
This leads to the second problem. The intervening event in the Strieff
case was a product of the actions of the very same police officer that violated
Strieff¶s constitutional rights in the first place. Make no mistake, the discovery
of the arrest warrant was the consequence of police conduct. The officer had to
ask Strieff for identification and then submit this information to the station, while
knowing all along that the purpose was to search for outstanding warrants.288
Only after this conduct does the officer undertake the ³ministerial´ act of
arresting Strieff and searching his person.289 The discovery of the evidence was
the consequence of police action. In situations such as this, our notion of
attenuation should not recognize police conduct as an intervening event. Assume,
for example, that Officer Smith illegally arrests suspect A and transports him to
the police lockup. Assume that less than an hour later Officer Smith visits A in
his cell, brings him some cookies and a glass of milk, expresses his regret at
having to arrest a nice guy like him, and offers to pray with the defendant. If the
defendant subsequently confesses, even if we can honestly say that the actions
of Officer Smith caused the subsequent confession, should we really recognize
this as an intervening event that dispelled the taint of the unconstitutional arrest?
Common sense fact finders would likely say no.290

Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.

287

Id. at 2062.
Justice Thomas seems to acknowledge the sequence of events precipitated by the officer
when he notes that ³[a]s part of the stop, Officer Frackrell requested Strieff¶s identification.´ Id. at
2060. It is important to note that this is not an argument in favor of Justice Kagan¶s foreseeability
approach. It makes no difference to this argument if Frackrell expected to discover an outstanding
warrant or not.
288

289
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Id. at 2063.
The Supreme Court has recognized this concern to some degree in Barry v. New Jersey
where it held that it was not an intervening event of significance when, after an illegal arrest, the
police confronted the defendant with incriminating evidence. Thus, the confession obtained after
290
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The consequence of such a provision would be to simplify the notion of
attenuation. Given that the purpose of examining intervening events is to
determine if they were responsible for the subsequent acts of the defendant rather
than the original Fourth Amendment violation, it is much easier to do this if the
event in question is truly significant and new. Trying to unravel the consequences
of two separate acts both committed by the same agent²the police²is simply
too difficult. Just as some would assume that all actions taken by the police are
part and parcel of a single course of action, others might actually attempt to sort
out what action was responsible for the defendant¶s subsequent volitional
actions. This would likely produce widely disparate results. The best evidence of
this has been court decisions following Strieff. Rather than producing a clear rule
that the presence of an unrelated, pre-existing warrant acts as an intervening
event that severs the causal link between the prior Fourth Amendment violation
and the subsequently discovered evidence, some courts have focused in on the
Supreme Court¶s language that such a situation ³strongly favors the State´291 and
have concluded that perhaps the presence of the warrant is just some evidence of
attenuation.292 Other courts have found ways to distinguish Strieff altogether
based on the situation.293 By removing intervening police activities from
consideration as potential intervening events that sever causation we allow a
more straightforward assessment of whether something else caused the
defendant¶s cooperation aside from the conduct of police.
C. Remove Test Three from Brown
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A somewhat more radical reform would remove any reference to the
purpose and flagrancy of the policy conduct when considering if attenuation is
present. As this Article has previously argued, the flagrancy of police conduct is
not an obvious factor in assessing causality. It is difficult to articulate a reason
for why flagrant violations of the Fourth Amendment would cause a defendant
to confess later on while a ³good faith´ mistake would not. The Brown Court
seems to suggest two reasons for the linkage. First, Brown does suggest that
police violations of the Fourth Amendment that are undertaken for the purpose

this was not attenuated. 454 U.S. 1017, 1020±21 (1981) (White, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Taylor
v. Alabama, the Court held that the fact that the police had obtained an arrest warrant for the
defendant for an unrelated offense did not sever the causal link between the original illegal arrest
and the subsequent confession. 457 U.S. 687, 692±93 (1982). In both of these cases, the intervening
event was an action undertaken by the police.
291
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
292

See United States v. Lowery, 935 F.3d 638, 644 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Gaines,
918 F.3d 793, 800 (10th Cir. 2019).
293
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See United States v. Hunter, No. 18-cr-00542-RS-1, 2019 WL 2353121, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
May 31, 2019). Here the Court suggests that because the Fourth Amendment violation occurred in
a home rather than on the street²as in Strieff²the presence of the prior arrest warrant does not
support a conclusion of attenuation. Id.
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Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975).
Id.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063.
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of subsequently obtaining a confession or consent to search are particularly
reprehensible.294 Accepting that as a given, it does not mean that the police
purpose has anything to do with what caused the defendant to confess. In most
cases, the defendant would not even be aware of the police¶s purpose when acting
as they did. Thus, from this perspective, police purpose as an attenuation test
may simply be a means to deny scheming police officers the opportunity to
successfully argue attenuation. This is a policy choice²not one tied to causality.
Brown also argues that the flagrancy of the police conduct is tied to
situations in which the officers conduct ³gives the appearance of having been
calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.´295 The argument seems to be
that conduct such as this will impress itself upon the mind of the defendant in
such a way as to be almost inevitably the cause of subsequent voluntary actions
by a defendant that lead to incriminating evidence. Such an argument does have
causal merit. However, this would seem to limit this factor¶s relevance to the
most extreme situations. What are we to do in those situations in which the police
misconduct doesn¶t rise to this level of flagrancy? Is factor three then simply a
nullity or, as the Supreme Court has argued, does this lack of flagrancy support
a finding of attenuation? Such a conclusion is hard to understand. How can it be
that if a police officer violates a defendant¶s Fourth Amendment rights, but does
so politely, that there is less chance of a causal linkage between the Fourth
Amendment violation and the subsequent confession? The defendant is still
impermissibly seized or even locked up²even if the officer did have a smile on
his face.
Eliminating factor three eliminates this bizarre outcome. Causality
should be determined by factors that assist in assessing the presence or absence
of a causal link. Perhaps best of all, elimination of factor three eliminates the
linkage between attenuation and the policy objective of deterrence that has
migrated into recent Supreme Court decisions. This impermissible linkage is
most obviously found in Strieff where Justice Thomas states that factor three
assists the Court by ³favoring exclusion only when the police misconduct is most
in need of deterrence²that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant.´296 While an
inquiry into the purpose and flagrancy of police conduct may inform us as to the
likelihood that exclusion will deter such conduct in the future, it tells us nothing
about causality. Justice Thomas doesn¶t even mention the concept of causality
when discussing factor three. Removing this factor does nothing to affect the
causal utility of the attenuation concept, but it certainly allows us to sever this
causal question from any considerations of the appropriate remedy.
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D. A Totality Approach
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Perhaps one of the most frustrating aspects of the Brown case is its
failure to assist the future finder of fact in assessing the impact of the factors
listed as a whole. In other words, how do we weigh each factor? Are some factors
necessary? Sufficient? Are some factors more important than others? Without
such direction we see courts struggling to assess situations where some factors
are present, and some are not. Is this a simple case of math²whichever side had
the largest number of factors wins? Or can the impact of a single factor be so
significant as to override anything else? It is possible to overcome these problems
with a simple formula²the totality of the circumstances.
Often the totality of the circumstances approach gets a bad rap. It can be
seen as the last refuge for a court when no better approach is readily apparent.
Yet, there are occasions, particularly when making factual conclusions, when the
totality of the circumstances best articulates the searching approach the finder of
fact must undertake. How might such an approach work in the context of
attenuation? First, we have to remember what we are asking. Keeping in mind
the changes suggested above, the question becomes, ³Did the police violation of
a suspect¶s Fourth Amendment rights cause him or her to ultimately confess or
consent to a physical search of some sort?´ We know, from the remaining factors
from Brown²temporal proximity and presence of an intervening event²that
there are some specific things we should look for when answering the question.
We also know that these factors can support different conclusions. A
lapse of a short period of time is viewed as supporting the claim that there is a
causal link between the Fourth Amendment violation and the subsequent
confession or consent. Thus, a claim of attenuation is not supported. Similarly,
the absence of any intervening factors supports that claim that the causal link
described above is present and attenuation is not likely. On the flip side, similar
conclusions can be drawn. A lengthy lapse of time or a significant intervening
event can be seen to sever the causal link and can be viewed as supporting the
claim of attenuation. What happens, however, when only one of the factors
supporting attenuation is present? In other words, a lengthy lapse of time and no
intervening event or a short lapse of time and an intervening event? Without the
third factor of ³purpose and flagrancy´ to break the tie, what do we do?
It is now that the common-sense notions of causality come into play. The
finder of fact needs to examine the ³totality of the circumstances´ and simply
decide if it is more or less likely that the Fourth Amendment violation was the
ultimate cause of the confession or consent.297 United States v. Walker offers us
an interesting case study.298 The police engaged in an impermissible stop²a

297
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See, e.g., Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 316 (Ind. 2018) (³In application, the federal
attenuation doctrine essentially considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
illegality and the discovered evidence.´).
298
United States v. Walker, 965 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2020).
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Fourth Amendment violation.299 The evidence discovered included an admission
by the defendant that drugs were on his person.300 The Court concluded that
temporal proximity favored the defendant¶s claim of a causal link between the
impermissible stop and the confession.301 However, an intervening factor of
significance (the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant) favored the
government¶s claim of attenuation.302 Without the third factor (which was hotly
disputed in the Walker case), what should we do? A court possessed with reason,
experience, and a modicum of common sense should examine all the
circumstances²particularly the two remaining Brown factors²and reach a
conclusion on causality. Such a conclusion may not be perfect. It may not even
be accurate all of the time. But it will be the kind of causal conclusion that
ordinary people reach all of the time. And, perhaps most importantly, it will be
free from the confusing side issues, illogical assumptions, and policy-based
considerations of the appropriate remedy that the Supreme Court has injected
into the causal fact-finding process over the past 45 years.
VI.

CONCLUSION
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Attenuation, as a causal concept, has great value for fact finders. By
limiting the breadth of a Fourth Amendment violation to those events that are
actually caused by the violation itself, we allow the fact finder to rationally
restrict the awesome consequences of a Fourth Amendment violation to only
those situations in which a severe remedy is merited. Regrettably, attenuation as
a Fourth Amendment concept has atrophied over time and has morphed into
something that has very little to do with causation. Whether it is used by
advocates of the deterrence theory of the exclusionary rule to limit the scope of
the remedy, or whether it is so overly defined as to create a morass of
contradictory tests that fail to work together well, attenuation is in dire need of
reform.
Attenuation needs to return to its roots as a purely causal concept. As
such, it will allow the finder of fact, using his or her common sense, to identify
those situations in which the illegal activities of the police actually caused the
criminal defendant to do something which was incriminating²either confessing
or consenting to a search of his effects. While this does not seem to be much, it
is enough. By focusing on this one task, finders of fact can accurately limit the
consequences of a Fourth Amendment violation to only those situations in which
the conduct of the police actually mattered.
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A failure to address the attenuation problem will, ultimately, lead to its
demise as a meaningful concept. The Supreme Court has expanded the ³good
faith exception´ to cover a number of clear Fourth Amendment violations, and it
would take very little to see this approach subsume the entire attenuation
doctrine. In other words, if all that really matters is whether the office acted in
good faith when they violated a suspect¶s Fourth Amendment rights, then the
third prong of the Brown test is the only prong that matters. For those examples
of ³good faith´ police misconduct, causation is no longer relevant. Such an
approach would result in the rendering of policy-based decisions before it has
been established that, factually, such a policy-based decision is even necessary.
Such an outcome will, inevitably, lead to public discontent with the law.
Establishing the fundamental facts must come first²irrespective of the policy
choices that such facts force us to make.
By returning to the fact-based, causal roots of the attenuation doctrine,
the Court can achieve judicial efficiency and clarity in an area of the law that has
been notorious for its lack of clarity over the past few years. Attenuation serves
as the sorting mechanism for policy-driven remedy choices. Only when there is
a clear causal linkage between illegal police conduct and subsequently
discovered incriminating evidence does the Court need to get involved. As our
history of attenuation has illustrated, cases involving simple factual disputes on
the application of the attenuation doctrine are rarely before the Supreme Court.
This is due, in large part, to our lower courts¶ ability to effectively sort out the
wheat from the chaff. Invariably, when the Supreme Court has gotten involved
in attenuation issues (e.g., Utah v. Strieff), the consequence has been to muddy
the waters and make the factual determination more difficult. If we can strip
away all of the gloss that has attached itself to the attenuation doctrine, that which
is left will more than adequately serve the purpose of causal fact-finding.
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